Anti-Utilitarianism

[theVOID]

And how is appealing to desires not equally an appeal to intuition?

Because desires are the source of all values, this isn't based on intuition it is based on the fact that every single value statement with basis in the real world can be rephrased as a statement of desires.

Challenge this notion if you like, present a value statement that you don't think can be reduced to desires and if it's a value statement that exists in the real world then I'll concede the point.

Why appeal to desires?

Because they are the source of all values.

If Desires are the source of all values and morality deals with conflicting values, then morality is necessarily an evaluation of conflicting desires - There is no reason to impose a temporal limit on this evaluation, so it's necessarily consequentialist too.

I start from the premise that suffering is bad and that saving the worst suffering/worst sufferers is the priority. The evaluation is about figuring out who suffers most and prioritizing them.

I knew all of that, but why?

That's a very powerful example and intuitively I'm inclined to agree with you (and save the 100,000). But starting from the premise that suffering is bad, and the worst suffering is what needs to be saved, I can't agree based on that rationale.

Well at least you're consistent, but to me that example shows a flaw in using suffering as the evaluation, like all arbitrary constraints it breaks down at extremes.

Intuitively speaking I say, cut off two toes off the one person. OBVIOUSLY. And furthermore, the 'ABSURD' conclusion that I agreed to earlier when I chose to save the man rather than the many raped women, I also would intutively choose to save the women. But it depends if I'm going by my intuition of disgust or if I'm going by the rationale to save those who suffer most (which is also intuitively based, but isn't merely my moral disgust, it's a conclusion drawn from my moral premise that suffering is bad and those that suffer most are the priority to be saved).

You should always go by the rationale, if you have a moral theory but forgo it in favour of your intuitions then you might as well not have one, period. The problem with intuitions is that they permit a great many people to do many things, not because of any reasoning, but because of their own emotional reactions.

Only separately.

That isn't in any way a problem. Separate instances of cognitive processes can still be compared, different groups containing separate instances of cognitive processes can also be compared.

But why is it accurate to aggregate those suffering separately when they only ever suffer separately?

We aren't aggregating them, we're comparing them relative to something we want to know about the situation. If we want to know what situation has more suffering then we evaluate the situation with quantitative and qualitative measures - It's entirely conceptual, there is absolutely no need for an aggregate experience.

I consider the question "What do you like?" and "What do you dislike?" as the premises to start with. You consider "What do you desire?" and "what do you not desire?" as the premises to start with. Am I correct?

That's because like and dislike are statements about what fulfils a specific desire, such as food stimulating our biochemical systems in the brain, we desire some specific stimulation and then like or dislike things relative to their ability to fulfil this desire.

The premise I start with is that desires are the source of all value, from there the only thing it makes sense to evaluate is desires, in their many subsets.

Why choose your premises over mine?

Because desires are the source of all value, suffering is only a subset of desires and thus is needlessly and unjustifiably excluding other values.

Intuitively, based on my moral disgust, I say no, save the 10.

It seems to me like you're using intuition and then trying to distance yourself from the potential chaos of intuitive morality with a half-baked moral theory...

Based on my intuitive premise that suffering is bad and those who suffer the most need to be saved first, I'd say yes, save the group containing the sufferer that suffers most.

Why, because you have an argument for suffering being the source of moral evaluation, or because of another intuition?

It's merely intuition

That says it all really.

Intuitively, based on my moral disgust I say save everyone on earth.

Based on my intuitive premise that suffering is bad and those who suffer the most need to be saved first, I'd say save the person who suffers the most pain in the long run as a result of it. That could be the person who loses two toes simply because he loses an extra toe so twice the trouble, but given the numbers of the people on earth it's possible that someone losing one toe copes less well than the man who suffers two, so I'd probably also still save everyone else based on that.

That's if I analyse it, otherwise I'd just go by the rationale that the person who loses two toes is worse off so I prioritize them to be saved.

Okay then, the suffering value takes into account all future suffering resulting from the loss of toes as well as the initial suffering.

Now do you chose to save the one person?