Anti-Utilitarianism

[Edwardo Piet]

Because desires are the source of all values, this isn't based on intuition it is based on the fact that every single value statement with basis in the real world can be rephrased as a statement of desires.

It all seems to make sense to me. I just wonder: If you haven't got any objective proof that desirism should be followed, in what sense is desirism objective? Simply because our desires match our values (and actually are our values) in the real world?

Because they are the source of all values.

Are desires the source of all values?

Or are desires identical to values?

I knew all of that, but why?

I tend to appeal to suffering being bad as my premise for morality because the worst suffering in the world more than outweighs the greatest pleasures in the world. I appeal to this through empathy.

I mean, I'll just ask you - would you prefer those who suffer the greatest to have their pains alleviated, or would you prefer those who are already enjoying themselves a lot to have their pleasures increased further?

Well at least you're consistent, but to me that example shows a flaw in using suffering as the evaluation, like all arbitrary constraints it breaks down at extremes.

I'm really starting to agree with you. I know a lot of my conclusions have seemed intuitively absurd and intuitively immoral but I would rather argue from my reason consistently even if it's wrong than succumb to mere moral disgust or yuck factor.

You should always go by the rationale

Good, I'm glad we agree there. This is why I stick to my guns if my rationale still disagrees, even if intuitively I'm starting to find my own rationale to be absurd.

I don't just want to think I'm wrong. I want to know why I'm wrong before I stop arguing my point.

If you have a moral theory but forgo it in favour of your intuitions then you might as well not have one, period.

Indeed, but I'd rather have a bad moral theory than none at all. Because at least I can correct a bad moral theory, or change it altogether - that's better than sticking merely to moral disgust and never having a moral theory. In my opinion anyway.

The problem with intuitions is that they permit a great many people to do many things, not because of any reasoning, but because of their own emotional reactions.

I hate intuition quite a lot. I find there's very often little difference between it and faith. I try to see how far my reason will take me, that's how you do philosophy right? Jumping to conclusions via intuition rather than reasoning to them via reason - I wouldn't call that philosophy.

That isn't in any way a problem. Separate instances of cognitive processes can still be compared, different groups containing separate instances of cognitive processes can also be compared.

Sure, I'm not against comparison. I just think any form of Utilitarianism that aggregates utilities such as pain and pleasure that require separate, individual conscious experience is making a mistake because - how could they be meaningfully aggregated together when in reality they are fundamentally separate?

We aren't aggregating them, we're comparing them relative to something we want to know about the situation.

Well it looks like we're in agreement there. Aggregating them makes no sense, right?

That's because like and dislike are statements about what fulfils a specific desire, such as food stimulating our biochemical systems in the brain, we desire some specific stimulation and then like or dislike things relative to their ability to fulfil this desire.

Seems both consistent and also seems to make a lot of sense. Desires are identical to values in actual reality?

The premise I start with is that desires are the source of all value, from there the only thing it makes sense to evaluate is desires, in their many subsets.

Okay so desires really are the source of all values and are not identical to them? Then what constitutes a value in the real world?

Because desires are the source of all value, suffering is only a subset of desires and thus is needlessly and unjustifiably excluding other values.

Yep, all makes sense. Seriously, when we are comparing values in the real world, we're also comparing desires, it really does seem to make a lot more sense to me now we go over it again.

I still wonder though, are desires just the source of values or are they also values themselves?

It seems to me like you're using intuition and then trying to distance yourself from the potential chaos of intuitive morality with a half-baked moral theory...

Well, I normally start with two intuitive premises (I think you know them, as you said) - but then I try to reason from there.

Why, because you have an argument for suffering being the source of moral evaluation, or because of another intuition?

Both.

Okay then, the suffering value takes into account all future suffering resulting from the loss of toes as well as the initial suffering.

Now do you chose to save the one person?

No.