If I may throw out an alternative (and old) conception of the will's freedom, consider this:
The will used to be considered the "rational appetite", i.e. that part/aspect/power/faculty/whatever of a person which "hungers" for being (in its own rational context, being as goodness). In this sense, as a rational faculty, the "direction/choice" of the will is "determined" by goodness in the abstract (i.e. the will cannot not seek goodness).
Consider that compared to what used to be called the intellect, i.e. that power/faculty/whatever of a person which "understands/apprehends" being (in its own rational context, being as truth). In this sense, as a rational faculty, the intellect is "determined" to truth in the abstract (i.e. it cannot not apprehend/understand truth).
Together, the intellect and the will comprise reason/rationality (as opposed to the intellect alone).
People live in this particular universe which is filled with particular things which are more or less good for particular purposes depending on circumstances. In other words, all people are constantly surrounded by a field of particular things, each of which are more or less good when considered for different purposes and in different circumstances. There is no particular thing which can be considered good in every aspect and in every circumstance and for every purpose. If a person ever encountered such an imaginary thing, that person could not NOT choose and seek it, regardless of context and circumstance.
If a human-will never encounters a particular thing that is good in every aspect for every purpose and in every circumstance, then no one particular thing "determines" the human-will. In that sense, the will is free.
Do the particular things in the field of goods in the universe influence/exert a directing force on the will? CERTAINLY. In fact, that is the reason any of us do anything at all. Some things influence the will more than others, but none of them universally determine the human-will, and so it remains free.
Now, the question remains: if the things which people encounter influence the will and are at least partially causative of our actions, does the acting person have any self-determining power/influence on the action? If yes, in what sense is that determination "free"? I'll stop there for now.
The will used to be considered the "rational appetite", i.e. that part/aspect/power/faculty/whatever of a person which "hungers" for being (in its own rational context, being as goodness). In this sense, as a rational faculty, the "direction/choice" of the will is "determined" by goodness in the abstract (i.e. the will cannot not seek goodness).
Consider that compared to what used to be called the intellect, i.e. that power/faculty/whatever of a person which "understands/apprehends" being (in its own rational context, being as truth). In this sense, as a rational faculty, the intellect is "determined" to truth in the abstract (i.e. it cannot not apprehend/understand truth).
Together, the intellect and the will comprise reason/rationality (as opposed to the intellect alone).
People live in this particular universe which is filled with particular things which are more or less good for particular purposes depending on circumstances. In other words, all people are constantly surrounded by a field of particular things, each of which are more or less good when considered for different purposes and in different circumstances. There is no particular thing which can be considered good in every aspect and in every circumstance and for every purpose. If a person ever encountered such an imaginary thing, that person could not NOT choose and seek it, regardless of context and circumstance.
If a human-will never encounters a particular thing that is good in every aspect for every purpose and in every circumstance, then no one particular thing "determines" the human-will. In that sense, the will is free.
Do the particular things in the field of goods in the universe influence/exert a directing force on the will? CERTAINLY. In fact, that is the reason any of us do anything at all. Some things influence the will more than others, but none of them universally determine the human-will, and so it remains free.
Now, the question remains: if the things which people encounter influence the will and are at least partially causative of our actions, does the acting person have any self-determining power/influence on the action? If yes, in what sense is that determination "free"? I'll stop there for now.
