RE: Free will
May 21, 2016 at 4:51 pm
(This post was last modified: May 21, 2016 at 4:53 pm by Ignorant.)
Consider an action (X) which includes the circumstances in which X will take place.
Assume that foreknowledge of your doing X in the future is possible.
X, therefore, is determined (i.e. it is absolutely certain that you will do X)
Either you do X of necessity (i.e. your NOT doing X is metaphysically impossible), or you do X contingently (i.e. your not doing X is metaphysically possible).
Assume that it is possible to foreknow which of the above is the case for X (n vs. c)
For example: If it is possible to foreknow an action Xc (i.e. an action of which the failure to obtain is a metaphysical possibility) AS contingent, then it is both determined and contingent.
You will certainly, therefore, do X, which is a contingent action.
If X a necessary action, it cannot be the case that it is done freely. If X is a contingent action, it is either done freely or not.
Assume it is possible to foreknow if Xc is done freely.
Then, you will certainly do X freely, which is a contingent action.
In short, contingency is a requisite for free action, but it is not equivalent. Neither contingency nor freedom contradict determinism, and neither absolutely require in-determinism. Rather, both are qualities of actions taking place within either hypothetical system: contingency dealing purely with the objective act, freedom dealing purely with the manner of the subject acting. <= That last part is important, because contingency (the metaphysical possibility of multiple actions) is not the same as freedom (knowing what you're doing, knowing the reason for which you are doing it, and doing what you know you're doing for the reason you know).
God's existence is not absolutely necessary for free action either within a deterministic model of the universe or with the opposite. If an all-knowing God did exist, his foreknowledge of human action would include (and would make real) the qualities of those actions.
One quick example. I drank a gin and tonic tonight. I, being human, am the sort of thing which is metaphysically capable of having a coca cola instead. If an all-knowing God eternally knew that I would drink that gin and tonic, then it was eternally determined that I would do it, even though, as a human being, I am metaphysically capable of drinking something else. In such a case, it was still a contingent action, even though it was a determined action. If God determined it, then it would be impossible that I not drink it; however, it would be equally impossible that drinking it was not contingent. If we can't get that part understood, then there is no point in trying to hash out the freedom part.
Assume that foreknowledge of your doing X in the future is possible.
X, therefore, is determined (i.e. it is absolutely certain that you will do X)
Either you do X of necessity (i.e. your NOT doing X is metaphysically impossible), or you do X contingently (i.e. your not doing X is metaphysically possible).
Assume that it is possible to foreknow which of the above is the case for X (n vs. c)
For example: If it is possible to foreknow an action Xc (i.e. an action of which the failure to obtain is a metaphysical possibility) AS contingent, then it is both determined and contingent.
You will certainly, therefore, do X, which is a contingent action.
If X a necessary action, it cannot be the case that it is done freely. If X is a contingent action, it is either done freely or not.
Assume it is possible to foreknow if Xc is done freely.
Then, you will certainly do X freely, which is a contingent action.
In short, contingency is a requisite for free action, but it is not equivalent. Neither contingency nor freedom contradict determinism, and neither absolutely require in-determinism. Rather, both are qualities of actions taking place within either hypothetical system: contingency dealing purely with the objective act, freedom dealing purely with the manner of the subject acting. <= That last part is important, because contingency (the metaphysical possibility of multiple actions) is not the same as freedom (knowing what you're doing, knowing the reason for which you are doing it, and doing what you know you're doing for the reason you know).
God's existence is not absolutely necessary for free action either within a deterministic model of the universe or with the opposite. If an all-knowing God did exist, his foreknowledge of human action would include (and would make real) the qualities of those actions.
One quick example. I drank a gin and tonic tonight. I, being human, am the sort of thing which is metaphysically capable of having a coca cola instead. If an all-knowing God eternally knew that I would drink that gin and tonic, then it was eternally determined that I would do it, even though, as a human being, I am metaphysically capable of drinking something else. In such a case, it was still a contingent action, even though it was a determined action. If God determined it, then it would be impossible that I not drink it; however, it would be equally impossible that drinking it was not contingent. If we can't get that part understood, then there is no point in trying to hash out the freedom part.
