RE: Free will
May 26, 2016 at 7:04 am
(This post was last modified: May 26, 2016 at 7:36 am by Ignorant.)
[EDIT: I posted an unfinished post by mistake, there was heavy editing]
Great to get your thoughts, rob.
Right, I am aware the word has been used in this way. This isn't exactly wrong either, but it does ignore something important about the term "determine". A determination is certainly the outcome of a choice, but if it is the outcome of a choice, then choice occurred. If an all-knowing god has a choice of outcomes, then there are more than one possible outcomes. Hence, my desire to properly and helpfully distinguish it from necessity.
This claim is true, but it uses "necessary" equivocally. Here is why:
Consider some thing (T) (e.g. a fruit tree) doing some action (A) (e.g. making fruit) which depends on the conditions X, Y, Z.
We can say:
Suppose T
If all X, Y and Z, then T necessarily does A.
If not all X, Y and Z, then T necessarily does not A
This ^ is how you are using "necessary" in the above claim. Given certain conditions, there is no way A will not happen. The determination (and therefore knowledge) of god is made in respect to the conditional AND the relationship between the conditional and the consequent.
Now consider the same T and some act (An) occurring unconditionally.
We can say:
Suppose T
An (of necessity)
This ^ is how I am using "necessary". In this case, there are no conditions according to which T would not do An. Supposing the thing T, there is no possible way An does not occur. (e.g. a tree which makes fruit necessarily will make fruit anywhere (e.g. complete darkness, the moon, mars, saturn, etc.) and as long as T exists).
Now, if an all-knowing god determines that certain actions occur according to conditions, it must be the case that those actions occur exactly according to those exact conditions. If they happen according to conditions, then they can't be said to be happening necessarily (i.e. according to the meaning I wish to distinguish)
Can the action "not happen"?
In one sense, No. Why? Because all of the conditions for its happening are present and fulfilled. Being present and fulfilled, the conditions necessarily provide for the action. Fruit trees necessarily make fruit under certain conditions.
In another sense, Yes. Why? Because, as determined to be conditional, it is equally possible that god does not create the conditions for the action to obtain, while still creating the thing. Fruit trees necessarily don't make fruit under certain conditions.
(May 26, 2016 at 6:38 am)Rhythm Wrote: The word [determined] has been consistently used to refer to the status of the outcome of a choice, not the method by which that outcome is arrived upon.
Great to get your thoughts, rob.
Right, I am aware the word has been used in this way. This isn't exactly wrong either, but it does ignore something important about the term "determine". A determination is certainly the outcome of a choice, but if it is the outcome of a choice, then choice occurred. If an all-knowing god has a choice of outcomes, then there are more than one possible outcomes. Hence, my desire to properly and helpfully distinguish it from necessity.
Quote:In this thread, by reference to it's repeated use - and in context of the requirements for a true claim of foreknowledge, it does equal necessity.
This claim is true, but it uses "necessary" equivocally. Here is why:
Consider some thing (T) (e.g. a fruit tree) doing some action (A) (e.g. making fruit) which depends on the conditions X, Y, Z.
We can say:
Suppose T
If all X, Y and Z, then T necessarily does A.
If not all X, Y and Z, then T necessarily does not A
This ^ is how you are using "necessary" in the above claim. Given certain conditions, there is no way A will not happen. The determination (and therefore knowledge) of god is made in respect to the conditional AND the relationship between the conditional and the consequent.
Now consider the same T and some act (An) occurring unconditionally.
We can say:
Suppose T
An (of necessity)
This ^ is how I am using "necessary". In this case, there are no conditions according to which T would not do An. Supposing the thing T, there is no possible way An does not occur. (e.g. a tree which makes fruit necessarily will make fruit anywhere (e.g. complete darkness, the moon, mars, saturn, etc.) and as long as T exists).
Now, if an all-knowing god determines that certain actions occur according to conditions, it must be the case that those actions occur exactly according to those exact conditions. If they happen according to conditions, then they can't be said to be happening necessarily (i.e. according to the meaning I wish to distinguish)
Can the action "not happen"?
In one sense, No. Why? Because all of the conditions for its happening are present and fulfilled. Being present and fulfilled, the conditions necessarily provide for the action. Fruit trees necessarily make fruit under certain conditions.
In another sense, Yes. Why? Because, as determined to be conditional, it is equally possible that god does not create the conditions for the action to obtain, while still creating the thing. Fruit trees necessarily don't make fruit under certain conditions.