The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[wiploc]

One topic keeps coming up all the time in this forum in almost every thread discussing God. It is the problem of evil in the world. It seems to be the position of most of you that the existence of God and the evil we see in the world is logically incompatible. I have never participated directly on this topic so I was wondering who might like to discuss it. 

It depends on the god.  Some gods are compatible with any amount of evil.  

The more benevolent a god was, the less evil there would be--if the god had enough power to effect its will.  If a god were sufficiently benevolent and sufficiently powerful, then there would be no evil.  

But there's one last factor:  Suppose a god was purely benevolent and infinitely powerful, but suppose further that this god was too stupid to realize that bad things happen.  If it was stupid or ignorant enough, even a very powerful very benevolent god could coexist with evil.  

But many Christians insist that god is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (call it "tri-omni for short).  A god like that would prevent all evil.  Evil would never happen.  

If you believe in a tri-omni god, but you don't believe in the existence of evil, then your belief may be criticized as implausible or unjustified, but it shouldn't be criticized as logically contradictory.  The logical contradiction doesn't happen until you add in the evil.  

A tri-omni god who coexists with evil is a contradiction.  It's like a square circle or a married bachelor, a contradiction in terms.  

First, we should distinguish between the intellectual problem of evil and the emotional problem of evil. The intellectual problem deals with the rational arguments for and against God/evil co-existing. The emotional problem deals with dislike of a God that permits suffering. Just to stay focused, I was hoping for a discussion on only the intellectual problem. Perhaps we can discuss the emotional problem later. 

I've never heard of the "emotional problem of evil."  We can skip it entirely as far as I'm concerned.  

The typical argument goes something like this:

1. If God exists, then evil cannot exist
2. If evil exist, God cannot exist
3. Evil exists
4. Therefore God does not exist.

If we stipulate that this god we're discussing is tri-omni, then, yes, it follows that evil does not exist if the god does.  

There is no explicit contradiction so I am assuming you have implicit contradictions. Does anyone care to articulate them in a manner we can discuss? 

A benevolent god wants good instead of evil.  An omnibenevolent god totally, purely, strongly, unconflictedly, infinitely wants good instead of evil.  An omnibenevolent god would prevent all evil if it only had the power to do so.  

An omnipotent god can do anything other than violate logic. 

(A truly omnipotent god might be able to violate logic too.  After all, he created logic, right?  He can break it like a defective pot.  There is nothing it cannot do, including make square bachelors and married circles, right?  But then logic wouldn't work.  We couldn't have logical discussions because X and not-X could both be true.  The god could make it so A equals B and B equals C but A doesn't equal C.  It could make modus ponens into modus ponies. 

So, if we want to have a logical discussion, we must set aside truly omnipotent gods.  What we can discuss is punk omnipotent gods, those who can do anything except violate logic.  Therefore, when I use the word "omnipotence" I'll be referring to punk omnipotence.)

An omniscient god knows everything.  It not only knows everything that will ever happen in the actual world and in every possible world, it also knows, according to Plantinga, everything that will happen in every impossible world.  An omniscient god knows of any evil that will happen, and knows how to use its knowledge and power to prevent that evil.   

Evil is that which a benevolent god wishes to prevent or minimize.  
 
An omnipotent god could prevent evil if it wanted to.  An omnibenevolent god would want to.  An omniscient god would know how to.  A tri-omni god--if it existed--would prevent all evil.

Therefore: if evil exists, tri-omni gods do not exist.  

NOTE: I am in no way minimizing the real pain and suffering in the world. In fact, the real pain and suffering might be so intense for some that a discussion on the intellectual problem might seem callous. I apologize now. That is not my intent.

If a tri-omni god existed, there would not be any evil.  

SteveII wrote:
Okay, let's grant that God, defined as the greatest possible being, would be omnibenevolent.

Defined as the greatest possible being?  That would be subjective and vague.  

If we want to define god, let's define him as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipotent.  That's the god we're talking about when we talk about the problem of evil.  

That would move it from a logical argument to a probabilistic argument. Is there sufficient reasons to think that God and evil co-existing is improbable. The conversation seems to be about natural evil (earthquakes, etc.). So does the presence of natural evil make the idea of an omnibenovent God improbable?

I prefer the LPoE (logical problem of evil).  Tri-omni gods are logically inconsistent with even the tiniest smidgen of evil.    

First, I would say that an omnibenevolent God would not cause natural disasters. So, are we to conclude that when events at the beginning were set in motion with our physical laws that God was therefore the remote cause of all future natural disasters?

What is a natural disaster? There is nothing inherently evil about a continental plate shift or a weather pattern developing. In fact, each of those events probably have positive natural effects for the environment. When humans suffer as a result, you are making a claim of what "ought not be". Additionally, people have the freedom to move in and out of harms way. How is is that God is responsible for human choices of when and where to be?

So really you are making the claim that God should not permit suffering as a result of natural disaster and it is illogical that an omnibenevolent God would do so. What "ought not be" "ought not be permitted". I am confused on a particular point: do you think God should prevent all natural "disasters", just those that harm people, or miraculously save people during such an event?

I had no idea of what "evil" meant until I took a Western Civilization class.  There is was defined as the sources of unhappiness.  Anything that caused unhappiness, and, by extension, unhappiness itself.  That was my first exposure to a meaningful, non-self-contradictory meaning of the word.  It made the word useful.  

But I do not insist on this definition.  It is not critical to the argument.  Let us illustrate by defining blue as evil.  All colors other than blue, then, are good.  A benevolent god wants nothing to be blue.  An omnibenevolent god totally, purely, intensely, and unconflictedly desires to prevent all blueness.  An omnipotent god would be able to prevent all blueness.  An omniscient god would know how to prevent all blueness.  A tri-omni god would actually prevent all blueness.  

Therefore, if we believe that some things are blue, we are logically required to believe that no gods exist who are totally opposed to blueness, powerful enough to prevent blueness, and smart enough to prevent blueness.  

You can substitute in any other value for "evil," and the PoE is still bulletproof.  

1. Being extremely limited in big picture knowledge, why do you think we can determine both what "ought not be" and what "ought not be permitted?

This is a red herring.  We aren't telling god what "ought" to happen, no more than we tell vegetarians that they shouldn't eat meat.  We only say that if you eat meat, then you are not a vegetarian.  And if you coexist with evil, then you are not tri-omni.  

God being omniscient (part of the definition) would see a big picture that we could in no way understand.

Are you conceding that it looks like we're right, that god isn't all that good?  And are you saying that even though it looks like god isn't all that good, you still have reason to believe he is?  Because that's a contradiction.  

You would have to prove that God did not have morally sufficient reasons to refrain from a) preventing a natural disaster or b) supernaturally intervening during one.

God being omniscient (part of the definition) he would have ways to prevent evil that you could in no way understand.  

2. Christian doctrine increases probability that God allows human suffering as a result of natural disasters.

Great!  Let us have it:

 a) The chief purpose of life is not happiness, but knowledge of God.  A natural disaster may increase that knowledge.

Perfect:  
Good is knowledge of god.
Evil is lack of knowledge of god.
Benevolence is desiring that there be knowledge of god rather than ignorance of god.  
Omnibenevolence is totally, purely, strongly, unconflictedly desiring knowlege of god rather than ignorance of same.  
Omnipotence is the power to see that there is no evil, no ignorance of god.  
Omniscience is the knowledge to know how to see that there is no evil, no ignorance of god.  

An omnibenevolent god would prevent all ignorance of god if it could.  
An omnipotent god could.
An omniscient god would know how.  
A tri-omni god would prevent all ignorance of god.
If there is any ignorance of god--any at all--then a tri-omni god does not exist.  
Therefore--if a tri-omni god existed--there would be no possible advantage to be gained by your natural disaster.  


Or we can do it this way:  
Knowledge of god and happiness are both good.
Ignorance of god and unhappiness are both evil.  
...
Therefore, if a tri-omni god existed, nobody would ever be ignorant of it, and nobody would ever be unhappy.  

 b) God's knowledge includes the greatest eternal good (the maximum number of people freely choosing salvation from an eternal perspective).

Let us define "goodworld" as one is which people have free will and never choose evil.  Actually that's for arguing with Plantinga.  Myself, I'd rather define it as as a world in which people have free will and are always very happy.  Every one of us, all the time, very happy.  But to be relevant to your argument, we'd probably want to define it as a world in which everyone always happy and always has a full knowledge of god.  Pick any definition you want, depending on which argument you are in at the time. 

Plantinga points out that an omniscient god would know which possible worlds were going to be goodworlds.  An omnipotent god could create any one of these worlds he wanted.*  An omnibenevolent god would want to create a goodworld as opposed to a badworld (any other world).  A tri-omni god would create a goodworld rather than a badworld.  

If the actual world is not a goodworld, then tri-omni gods do not exist.  

Footnote:  
* This was a slight overstatement.  Plantinga notes (contrary to William Lane Craig, but nonetheless obviously rightly) that some possible worlds are not created by gods.  A god cannot create any world that is not created by a god, because that would be a contradiction.  But there are still an infinite number of possible goodworlds that a tri-omni god could have made.   So this remains a fact:  If the actual world is not a goodworld, then tri-omni gods do not exist.  

 c) Man's knowledge of God is considered an incommensurable good (and end in itself)

If that is any kind of a truth, it is a subjective truth, a whim or caprice.  But, hey, we can grant it for the sake of argument and it doesn't change the fact that the PoE is bulletproof.  If there is any tiniest lack of knowledge of the your god, the your god is not tri-omni.  

NOTE: some of the bullet points adapted from a debate between William Lane Craig vs. Kai Nielsen

To conclude, I think for the above reasons, it is probable that God and natural evil can co-exist.

It is logically impossible for a tri-omni god to coexist with any kind of evil.