The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[wiploc]

Evil is that which a benevolent god wishes to prevent or minimize.  
 
An omnipotent god could prevent evil if it wanted to.  An omnibenevolent god would want to.  An omniscient god would know how to.  A tri-omni god--if it existed--would prevent all evil.

Therefore: if evil exists, tri-omni gods do not exist.  

If a tri-omni god existed, there would not be any evil.  

It is logically impossible for a tri-omni god to coexist with any kind of evil.

I prefer the LPoE (logical problem of evil).  Tri-omni gods are logically inconsistent with even the tiniest smidgen of evil.   

I pulled these statements from your post (it seemed to be your theme). Your reasoning is that God would somehow necessarily have to create a word in which there was no (let's use suffering). [Emphasis added]

It's not necessary for a vegetarian to abstain from meat, but someone who doesn't abstain from meat is not a vegetarian.

Likewise, it is not necessary for a god to oppose evil (yes, let's do call it suffering) but a god who does not oppose suffering is not benevolent, .  And a god who does not totally, strongly, purely, unconfictedly oppose suffering is not omnibenevolent.  

I don't think you can support that logically because there is no implicit nor explicit reasons that that should be the case.

It's just a matter of whether words have meaning.  If you want to define "omnibenevolent" as, "Doesn't have anything against evil," then you are free to do so.  If you want "omnipotent" to mean "can't even supersize fries," you can do that. 

But, of course, then you wouldn't be responding to my argument.  When I set out my argument, I made it clear what the words of the argument mean.  

I'm not saying gods ought to do anything.  I'm saying that benevolence consists of opposition to evil.  If evil is suffering, then benevolence is opposition to suffering.  If you don't  oppose suffering, you aren't benevolent. 

This has nothing to do with what god's ought to do or necessarily must do.  It does have to do with the conflicting claims that gods
1. Are all about preventing suffering, but they
2. don't prevent suffering.  

That's a contradiction.  

When people point out that it's a contradiction, you can't waive that away by saying, "You're trying to tell god what to do," or "You're saying it is necessary for god to be benevolent."  

(Note: You, Steve, haven't used the "You're trying to tell god what to do," line, but I run across that far more often than the one you use.) 

There are five relevant responses to the PoE:

1. God can't prevent suffering because he isn't isn't really all that powerful.  
2. God can't prevent suffering because he isn't smart or knowing enough to know how to do so.
3. God doesn't prevent suffering because he isn't that isn't so much against it.  
4. There is no suffering; it doesn't exist. 
5. Logic sucks: I believe that a tri-omni god coexists with evil, even if that belief is irrational.  

In discussions like this, I've run across all five responses.  I suspect you're after #3, but you haven't been specific.  If, instead of saying something like, "Why do you think it is necessary for god to oppose evil," you say instead something like, "My god is not opposed to evil," then we'll know.  

I'd like to know.  I'd like you to take a specific position.  

As long as we can conceive of a possible situation where God would have morally sufficient reasons to permit suffering, there is not a contradiction. ...

That confuses me.  Morality is supposed to be about reducing evil, isn't it?  What would be a moral reason for promoting evil?

In any case, no, there is no possible situation where a tri-omni god could have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.  This is because it is tri-omni. 

Let's say this god wants a teddy bear.  It can have a teddy bear and prevent evil.  It can do this because it is omnipotent: it can do anything that doesn't contradict logic.  It also has the smarts to do both, because it is omniscient.  And it can do both while being omnibenevolent because having a teddy bear doesn't necessarily increase evil.  (An omnipotent omniscient god can have a teddy bear without allowing evil.) 

If you don't think a teddy bear is a "morally sufficient reason," then you can plug in any other goal into that spot, and you will get the same result.  An omnipotent omniscient god can eliminate evil and have anything else it wants, because it is omnipotent. 

The only exception is if the other goal is evil itself.  Even an omnipotent god can't both eliminate evil and retain evil.  But a god who wanted to retain evil wouldn't be omnibenevolent. 

So, no, you cannot conceive of any "morally sufficient reason" that a tri-omni god would have for allowing evil.