The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[SteveII]

The Euthyphro dilemma absolutely still applies.  I've seen theists try this word game before.  Saying that "good" is intrinsic to the nature of God versus existing as a separate and independent property, is just a language gymnastic that in no way excuses him of the contradiction.

Attaching "good" to the definition of God's essence is convenient for the theist because it absolves him, and absolves God of the responsibility of defining what "good" actually means.  We are still left with the question of how such a moral determination of his character was reached in the first place.  How do we know that god's nature is "good"?  By what standards are we comparing god's essence in order to make such a judgement about his inherent morality?  Or, is God just circularly declaring that he is good because because he's God, and he is God because he is good?

So, as you can see, "God is inherently good" is just another vague, poorly defined, and essentially meaningless assertion in the end.  It doesn't get you out of Euthyphro's dilemma in the sense that you think; it only takes you safely away from it.  Without venturing to define what "good" actually means, you aren't even coming near the discussion.

It is not a word game. The dilemma states: Is the good good because God approves it, or does God approve it because it’s good? That statement means that goodness is either as a result of God's decree of the "goodness" of a good, or there some measure of goodness apart from God. The first horn clearly indicates a contingent property of God. 

The defeater of the dilemma is to point out that God's goodness is a necessary property (which is a third option). Goodness is not a property that God could have lacked. As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good. 

You seem to think that somehow we have to define "good" and otherwise being "vague, poorly defined, and essentially meaningless assertion in the end." First that is to confuse moral semantics (meaning of moral terms) with moral ontology (the foundation of morality). Second, no one is being vague. We all know what "good" "evil" "right" and "wrong" is. That objection is just a misdirection and in no way defeats the argument.