A Necessary Being?

[TheMuslim]

Is there anything wrong with a Necessary Being per se?

If you mean to ask whether something like that could exist, the answer is no.  

A necessary thing is a thing that exists in every possible world, but some possible worlds don't include necessary things.

We know this by definition:  A possible world is any world that doesn't include any logical contradictions (think square circles and married bachelors).  There is nothing contradictory about worlds without necessary beings.  Therefore, such worlds are, by definition, possible.  

Since some possible worlds don't include necessary beings, there can't be a necessary being in every possible world.  Yet that is the definition of necessary being: "a being that exists in all possible worlds." 

So, 
1. the NB must (by definition of "necessary") exist in every possible world if it exists at all, and
2. the NB does not (by definition of "possible world") exist in every possible world.  

Therefore, necessary beings do not exist.  

Is there really anything incoherent or illogical about the very concept of a Necessary Being?

I have trouble with transworld identity.  I am skeptical of the concept, at least as explained by Plantinga.  I am not in a position to call it incoherent, but I remain skeptical.  

But, again, if what you're really asking is whether one could exist, the answer is no.  

In other words, can anyone come up with reasons why a Necessary Being is impossible?

Yes.  See above.

Or have we now accepted that it is certainly possible for there to be a Necessary Being?

It is not possible.  It is impossible.  It can't happen.  It would be logically self-contradictory.  There is no possible world in which a necessary being is possible.  

You honed in on the question and didn't mindlessly sidetrack with puerile rants. I applaud you for that.

You, however, failed to differentiate between two different types of predication, just like Anselm and Kant did (or, shall I say, because Anselm and Kant did). There is a difference between "essential predication" and "accidental predication."

When I speak of a "Necessary Being," or "something that must have existence," I am predicating existence to it as essential predication (not as accidental predication). In other words, I am not saying that a Necessary Being must exist in the real world; I am simply saying that it - by its essential definition - cannot not exist. Despite the way it sounds to the mind at first glance, the definition isn't really making any claims about whether this thing exists in the real world(s).


Let's say I define a triangle as "a shape that has three sides." Now, whether or not a triangle actually exists in the real world - this is not the realm or the concern of the definition. The most that the definition can imply is that if a triangle exists, it must have three sides.

Similarly, when I define a Necessary Being as "a thing that exists in all possible worlds," my mere act of defining does not intend to imply that a Necessary Being actually exists in all possible worlds. The most that its definition can imply is that if a Necessary Being exists, it must exist in all possible worlds.


So it is indeed possible for the Necessary Being to not actually exist. However, once we find out that it exists, its definition would imply that it exists in all possible worlds (not just ours); it would imply that this known Necessary Being is eternal and did not ever not exist (and will not ever not exist), because it cannot not exist.

So the Necessary Being is not necessary in the sense that it must exist in the real world. It's necessary in the sense that if it exists, it must exist in all possible worlds - because that is in its definition. So once it is known that it exists, all possible worlds must have it.

I hope you understand the point I am trying to make. When looked at from this proper perspective, there really is nothing contradictory about the mere concept of a Necessary Being.

And just for the record, I do not believe that the modal ontological argument is sound. Anselm confuses essential predication with accidental predication; his argument is nothing more than an essential predication of existence to a concept.