A Necessary Being?

[TheMuslim]

It is imperative (and extremely relevant) to acknowledge the difference between "essential predication" and "accidental predication." If you are ignorant about these terms, read up on them.

I thought we were getting on well, but now suddenly you're all arrogant and insulting.  

A Necessary Being, by definition, cannot not exist. It must exist at all times, places, and worlds. But it is crucial to note that by saying this, I am predicating existence to the Necessary Being as an essential predicate, not as an accidental predicate.

I wonder if you don't just enjoy dressing up simple concepts in abstruse language.  Your first sentence was clear and succinct.  Your second sentence is redundant where it's not wrong.  The third sentence is a waste of words.  

It is impossible to predicate nonexistence to a Necessary Being as an essential predicate, because that would be a contradiction (a Necessary Being is, essentially, existent).

"Essentially existent," nice.  And above, "by definition cannot not exist," also nice.  What do you think you're adding to that with your predication talk, your imperative, extremely relevant (as if that were a concept), and crucial predication talk?   

However, it is indeed possible to predicate nonexistence to a Necessary Being as an accidental predicate. This would not lead to any contradictions (a Necessary Being has existence predicated to it as an essential predicate, not as an accidental predicate, and therefore denying its existence as an accidental predicate does nothing to harm it).

You're saying it is defined as existing even thought it doesn't happen to exist.  

In addition, you're saying I need lessons so I can talk fancy like you.  While I appreciate your concern, Plantinga and William Lane Craig get along fine without your terminology.  I choose to refute them using their own words.  

So one may conceive of a possible world with nonexistence predicated to the Necessary Being as an accidental predicate. This does not mean that a Necessary Being does not exist, because Necessary Beings do not even require existence in all possible worlds as an accidental predicate in the first place.

Now you've just confused yourself with your tricksy talk.  If a necessary being doesn't exist in one possible world, then it doesn't exist in any possible world.

I used the official terminology (the way it is used in academic philosophy writing) because it made it easier and pithier for me to express myself than repeatedly using the phrases "predicated as definition, or what it itself is" or "something which the thing happens to be in the real world." This is the reason why people use academic terminology at all, regardless of the field: to express ideas in a more succinct way. Brevity is the soul of wit.

You're saying that since there are possible worlds in which a Necessary Being does not actually exist, a Necessary Being - defined as something which exists in all possible worlds - cannot exist. This is fallacious reasoning, because you are presupposing that there are indeed "possible worlds" in which there are no Necessary Beings. You're playing the same card that many theists often mistakenly play. Why not be honest and admit that we simply don't know?

It depends on whether or not a Necessary Being exists in any world, and this is something you don't know - and therefore you cannot make any claims about NB-free possible worlds. If a Necessary Being doesn't exist (in any world), then a Necessary Being cannot exist in any world. But if a Necessary Being indeed exists in some world, then you cannot have "possible worlds in which there is no Necessary Being." Such worlds would then be impossible. The possibility of your "possible worlds without a Necessary Being" depends on whether or a Necessary Being actually exists in any world.

I can see how it might go either way. You may argue that a Necessary Being's existence depends on the existence of NB-less possible worlds, while someone else may argue that the existence of NB-less possible worlds depends on the existence of a Necessary Being. Choosing between the two might be an arbitrary decision, although I do think that choosing the latter one would make more sense because Necessary Beings (the kinds that are relevant to a theist-atheist debate) are concrete things while "possible worlds" are simply possibilities (I'd rather question the existence of merely possible worlds than the possibility of a concrete being).

And at the end of the day, I'm not really making any claims about the existence of a Necessary Being. You are. The burden of proof is on you, as you are claiming that a Necessary Being does not exist.

Therefore, necessary beings do not exist.

Is there anything wrong with a Necessary Being per se?

If you mean to ask whether something like that could exist, the answer is no.  

In your second post on this thread, you yourself provided two arguments - of identical logical form - that argue for and against the existence of a Necessary Being. If I'm correct, your reasoning against the possibility of a Necessary Being is based on the latter of those two arguments. If that is the case, then you are doing some pretty obvious cherry-picking. Since both use the exact same logic, why pick the latter over the former? You can't conclude that a Necessary Being is impossible with that kind of inconclusive logic.