(September 29, 2016 at 4:53 pm)Gemini Wrote: I think the argument from explanatory success and a tendency toward empiricist epistemology have more to do with the prevalence of mind/body physicalism here. The machine metaphor is obviously outdated to any one with a passing familiarity with contemporary cognitive and neuroscience.
Yes, but the basic context of "thing makes mind" is still there. Sure, it's not exactly "mechanistic," but it's still a matter of explaining experience in terms of something happening in a thing in a material world - as opposed to (and this is the crux of my post) the idea that material world is not a world that exists and in the terms of which experience is explained, but rather is a way we learn to think about this experience we learn to call "the world." I know that sound rather vague, but it's what I call a "world of difference difference." They present two fundamentally different realities.
