While I appreciate the help, I have been trying to communicate that I am NOT a nominalist, and only a nominalist has a problem with choosing between moral value inherent to human nature on the one hand and divine command of moral value without relation to human nature on the other.
I have been trying to say that the third option is that the inherent moral value of human action IS DIRECTLY DETERMINED BY the inherent telos of human nature which, in turn, is the free creation of god. God creates humanity in such a way that human nature itself communicates what is truly good or bad for human nature.
Your dilemma comes across to me as this:
Do things exist because they are good? or
Are things good because they exist?
And when "being" and "goodness" are interchangeable... it isn't much of a dilemma.
I'm wrong all of the time so I'm happy to be shown how.
I have been trying to say that the third option is that the inherent moral value of human action IS DIRECTLY DETERMINED BY the inherent telos of human nature which, in turn, is the free creation of god. God creates humanity in such a way that human nature itself communicates what is truly good or bad for human nature.
Your dilemma comes across to me as this:
Do things exist because they are good? or
Are things good because they exist?
And when "being" and "goodness" are interchangeable... it isn't much of a dilemma.
I'm wrong all of the time so I'm happy to be shown how.
