Euthyphro dilemma

[SteveII]

1. Neither. It defines good. All moral theories need an explanatory ultimate. This is a particularly good one since it is eternal and unchanging. 

That's option 2, not option "neither".  If tyhe definition of goodness is whatever a gods eternal and unchanging nature happened to be, then the definition of goodness is arbitrary.

Yes, the way you worded it was nearly the same as option 2. But it is far from the equivalent of the second horn. As I said to Jorm, you need God's nature to be arbitrary not in the sense that if could have been different, but that it still can be different. 

2. Nope. The first horn is clearly talking about a goodness as contingent property. It needs to be arbitrary otherwise the horn has no undesirable conclusion. I am talking about a nature that governs God. God cannot do or command anything in violation of his nature. 

Then whatever constrains god and gods nature as a good nature is the standard and definition of goodness.  Option 1.  

Horn 1: "is something good because God wills it" and the third option: "God cannot will anything that isn't good" are not the same thing.