Euthyphro dilemma

[Angrboda]

"Goodness is not a property that God could have lacked."
Whether or not God could have lacked the property says nothing about whether the standard of goodness resides with God, or outside of him.  Those are the only two options, and dressing it up with fancy terms like "necessary property" do nothing to evade the dilemma.

"As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good."
Again, this doesn't resolve the dilemma.  The question is not, "Is God good?" but rather, "Why is God considered to be good?"  Your objections about necessary properties and such do nothing to resolve that question.  You're still stuck on the horns of the dilemma, you've simply introduced a red herring.  Either the standard of goodness comes from God, in which case it's arbitrary, or it comes from outside him, and he is not the source of morals. There is no third place it can come from.   Moreover, the ontological argument is fatally flawed, so bringing things like "the greatest conceivable being" into the equation only undermines your argument.  Essentially, all you're saying is that God is good because you define him to be so; that isn't any kind of "third option."

Are God's eternal unchanging moral properties arbitrary? Could they have been any other way? Perhaps, perhaps not--I don't think that is clear. I don't think it matters however, because you need God's nature to be arbitrary not in the sense that if could have been different, but that it still can be different.

This is simply false. The question of arbitrariness at issue is whether there is any justification for God's morality external to himself, as this is the question of whether God's morals have a foundation or not. If they have no foundation other than himself, than you have grounded yourself on the horn of the dilemma which says that God's morals are arbitrary. Whether they "still can be different" is irrelevant with regard to the dilemma. Since the rest of your postulates follow upon this supposition, they too are irrelevant. You have no way of ascertaining the goodness of God's morals except by assuming that God's morals are good. It doesn't matter whether or not God "can change" or not. His being unable to change his ways provides no justification for those ways in the first place. It is in this sense that his morals are arbitrary, and it is the only sense in which it matters with respect to the dilemma. The dilemma in its basic formulation is all about how God justifies his morals. Whether they can change or not matters not a whit to the dilemma.

A nature that changes is a defect and not compatible with omniscience so that is not a coherent argument. If it is unchanging, and governs the actions of God consistently, then the dilemma is broken because neither horn applies.

As noted, this is simply false. Claiming the dilemma is broken and showing that it is are two different things. You've done nothing to deflect that God's morals are arbitrary in the sense that matters to the dilemma.

@steve
Imagine for a moment that you're god.  It shouldn't be too difficult.  Let's say that part of your nature was being dumb as a bag of rocks.  If your nature defines goodness, then being dumb as a bag of rocks is good.

However, if you weren't as dumb as a bag of rocks, if that wasn't in your nature..if..instead, you had even the slightest shred of intelligence, and your nature defined goodness, then having a shred of intelligence is good.

This is the arbitrarity being referenced.  Do you understand?

Again, you are equivocating. You need arbitrary  to mean "contingent on God's choice" NOT "it could have been some other way". If you use the second definition, then the horn does not have the unpleasant conclusion you need it to have to be a dilemma.

Contingency and necessity are red herrings. No he doesn't need arbitrary to mean that. He needs arbitrary to mean that God has no justification (aside from his own self) for the morals that he accepts. You keep trying to dictate what we mean by arbitrary in order to provide you with an "out" for God. Since the question is whether God's morals are justified by something other than himself, or only with reference to himself, the question of from whom or what God receives that justification is the only sense that matters. If his morals refer only to himself, then they are arbitrary by definition, and thus without moral significance.

I mean arbitrary in the sense that it could be a or the negation of a...depending on whatever gods nature or will was.  This is also the sense of arbitrarity being invoked by the dilemma.

All cleared up now?

But then you use the phrase: "depending on whatever gods nature or will was". Which one of these makes all the difference in the unwanted conclusion. If nature (which would be unchanging), then unpleasant conclusion avoided. Morality (including God's actions and commands) are rooted in something unchanging = objective.

If God's morals are rooted only in himself, then they are just arbitrary artifacts of the way God is, without any moral significance. Objective doesn't mean "rooted in something unchanging." Even if my preference for chocolate ice cream were inviolate, it would not make that preference "objective". No, "unpleasant conclusion avoided" is just wishful thinking.