Euthyphro dilemma

[SteveII]

Are God's eternal unchanging moral properties arbitrary? Could they have been any other way? Perhaps, perhaps not--I don't think that is clear. I don't think it matters however, because you need God's nature to be arbitrary not in the sense that if could have been different, but that it still can be different.

This is simply false.  The question of arbitrariness at issue is whether there is any justification for God's morality external to himself, as this is the question of whether God's morals have a foundation or not.  If they have no foundation other than himself, than you have grounded yourself on the horn of the dilemma which says that God's morals are arbitrary.  Whether they "still can be different" is irrelevant with regard to the dilemma.  Since the rest of your postulates follow upon this supposition, they too are irrelevant.   You have no way of ascertaining the goodness of God's morals except by assuming that God's morals are good.  It doesn't matter whether or not God "can change" or not.  His being unable to change his ways provides no justification for those ways in the first place.  It is in this sense that his morals are arbitrary, and it is the only sense in which it matters with respect to the dilemma.  The dilemma in its basic formulation is all about how God justifies his morals.  Whether they can change or not matters not a whit to the dilemma.

A nature that changes is a defect and not compatible with omniscience so that is not a coherent argument. If it is unchanging, and governs the actions of God consistently, then the dilemma is broken because neither horn applies.

As noted, this is simply false.  Claiming the dilemma is broken and showing that it is are two different things.   You've done nothing to deflect that God's morals are arbitrary in the sense that matters to the dilemma.  

Again, you are equivocating. You need arbitrary  to mean "contingent on God's choice" NOT "it could have been some other way". If you use the second definition, then the horn does not have the unpleasant conclusion you need it to have to be a dilemma.

Contingency and necessity are red herrings.  No he doesn't need arbitrary to mean that.  He needs arbitrary to mean that God has no justification (aside from his own self) for the morals that he accepts.  You keep trying to dictate what we mean by arbitrary in order to provide you with an "out" for God.  Since the question is whether God's morals are justified by something other than himself, or only with reference to himself, the question of from whom or what God receives that justification is the only sense that matters.  If his morals refer only to himself, then they are arbitrary by definition, and thus without moral significance.

But then you use the phrase: "depending on whatever gods nature or will was". Which one of these makes all the difference in the unwanted conclusion. If nature (which would be unchanging), then unpleasant conclusion avoided. Morality (including God's actions and commands) are rooted in something unchanging = objective.

If God's morals are rooted only in himself, then they are just arbitrary artifacts of the way God is, without any moral significance.  Objective doesn't mean "rooted in something unchanging."  Even if my preference for chocolate ice cream were inviolate, it would not make that preference "objective".  No, "unpleasant conclusion avoided" is just wishful thinking.

The first horn was whether a thing is good because God says it is good. The entire reason that the dilemma is even discussed is that this horn leaves Christians with the uncomfortable position that God has decreed what is good (which is arbitrary). I am saying that God has not decreed what is good. I am moving one step back and explaining that God is bound by his eternal inviolable nature wrapped up in the definition of God. God decreeing what is good and God being bound by his unchanging good nature are not the same thing therefore it is a third option and the dilemma is broken. 

You contend that in order to get away from the first horn you need the definition of goodness to be external to God. That's clearly not the case. Since if God is bound by his nature and could not decree anything contrary, then you need to reword the horn to say the good is good because it proceeds from the eternal inviolable nature of God. Such a statement is not remotely uncomfortable for Christians. 

Your chocolate ice cream example falls way short of a parallel because you used the word "preference". If God is bound by his nature, then there is no "preference". 

Regarding why God's nature has moral significance, it's part of the definition of God to be supreme or perfect in all of his attributes. I think anchoring morality in an eternal unchanging nature that even God is bound by is as objective as you can get.