Ontological Disproof of God

[Abaddon_ire]

If I'm understanding the OP correctly, he's appealing to Sartre's conception that we are all radically free at any moment to make any choice whatsoever (via nihilation of what we currently are).  To Sartre, the reason that people follow social and other norms is what he termed bad faith, that they essentially lie to themselves about their essential freedom, and disown responsibility for behaving in ways that are consistent with social and legal mores.  Apparently the OP feels that by prescribing laws to man, God is showing that he fundamentally misunderstands man's essential nature, and because He/It is mistaken, He/It cannot be God.  I have two problems with this.  I disagree with Sartre in ultimate conclusions about the nature of bad faith.  I don't think we are radically free in the sense he maintains because we are embodied in a biological form, thus there is a dependency between consciousness and our needs which is not simply an illusion.  So bad faith is transformed into an appropriate response to our carnal nature.  We are conditioned by biology.  I don't find either that dependency or our acting consonant with it to be in any sense bad or inauthentic, but rather the reverse.  That is, when we pretend we are radically free, we are acting in bad faith with respect to our actual condition.  So Sartre, I think, simply is wrong.  Second, theists and theology actually embrace a doctrine of radical freedom in positing the existence of libertarian free will.  Given that theologists historically have considered such freedom compatible with their beliefs, and even necessary according to some, would seem to suggest that this isn't really the problem the OP is making it out to be.  According to traditional theology, people utilize their freedom in accordance with facts and reason to arrive at behaviors, including abiding by laws and social norms.  Because they see this freedom as being based on an ability to respond to the facts of the world in a manner that is consistent with self interest, they do not view doing so as either bad or inauthentic.  So they fundamentally disagree with Sartre about the nature of human consciousness and human will as well.  I suppose one can insist that Sartre is right and they are wrong, but that's a different argument than the one that has been made.  I liked Sartre a lot when I was in high school.  As I grew older, I became disenchanted with his essentially moral take on radical freedom, and began to see that as problematic.  I still hold that, at minimum, there are things that Sartre's view simply does not take into account, even though it gets many things right.  So I don't find arguments based on Sartre's views in this area persuasive, if indeed that is what the OP is saying.

Anyway, that's my best guess about what the OP is trying to say, as well as my objections to that, if that indeed is his argument.

First, Jormungander, you said, given our facticity, we are not, cannot be, radical freedom; i.e., given our physiological being in the world, we cannot be totally and absolutely free, for we are inhibited and circumscribed by our very flesh; therefore, you maintain, Sartre is wrong, and, there can be no radical freedom.  Then, it appears, through the fog of some unclear "this"-writing", that you proceed to describe a certain absolute freedom practiced by divers theologicians/libertarians, whereby they adapt themselves to a world of law, etc..  Do you see the self-inconsistent/contradictory form of flux here,whereby you both posit against, and, then, for, an absolute freedom, and, thereby, ultimately support the position, i.e., Sartre's, which was originally asserted to be mistaken.  Negatio.

Bloody hell.

I am an atheist. I believe in no god/gods.

Most here are also atheists, believing in no god/gods.

For some reason you think that presenting a broken ontological argument for atheism will convince us all to somehow be more atheist than we already are.

It wont.