RE: Ontological Disproof of God
September 8, 2018 at 7:16 pm
(This post was last modified: September 8, 2018 at 7:25 pm by vulcanlogician.)
Okay, asshole.
Determinatio negatio est has nothing to do with "human action being an entirely negative procedure." Sartre was speaking of human action. You are conflating the sentiments of Sartre and Spinoza in part "a)" of your proof. Remember: Sartre is a free willist. Spinoza is a hard determinist. You cannot equate the ideas of the two thinkers without first addressing the gap between determinism and free will. You've wholly ignored it.
Let's get into Determinatio negatio est. What does it mean? Well, it concerns being, not action. Let's take a look at the Ethics.
In short, the substance in the universe is necessarily infinite. He calls this substance "God" ... though this is the sort of God that even atheists believe in. It is in fact the whole of nature that Spinoza calls "God." And in the above quote, Spinoza thinks he's shown nature to be necessarily infinite. But what does this have to do with Determinatio negatio est? When we refer to a specific thing, say, the desk in front of us, we say: "That is a desk." And in doing so we negate it's being because in fact it is not a desk, but rather "God" or "the infinite substance" that stands before us.
Pay attention to the bolded part to get at Spinoza's meaning. Also this:
So, in light of what I've provided here, how can you say: " The ‘determination’ considered herein is the mode of negation whereby a person originates an intentional act. Spinoza’s “determinatio negatio est” enunciates the realization that human determination to action is an entirely negative procedure"--????
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/97865/2/d...0final.pdf
(August 20, 2018 at 3:21 am)negatio Wrote: a). The ‘determination’ considered herein is the mode of negation whereby a person originates an intentional act. Spinoza’s “determinatio negatio est” enunciates the realization that human determination to action is an entirely negative procedure; and, J.P. Sartre (1905-1980), has given us a detailed description of the actual doubly nihilative process whereby human action upsurges ex nihilo.
Determinatio negatio est has nothing to do with "human action being an entirely negative procedure." Sartre was speaking of human action. You are conflating the sentiments of Sartre and Spinoza in part "a)" of your proof. Remember: Sartre is a free willist. Spinoza is a hard determinist. You cannot equate the ideas of the two thinkers without first addressing the gap between determinism and free will. You've wholly ignored it.
Let's get into Determinatio negatio est. What does it mean? Well, it concerns being, not action. Let's take a look at the Ethics.
Baruch Spinoza Wrote:PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.
Proof.—There can only be one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.
In short, the substance in the universe is necessarily infinite. He calls this substance "God" ... though this is the sort of God that even atheists believe in. It is in fact the whole of nature that Spinoza calls "God." And in the above quote, Spinoza thinks he's shown nature to be necessarily infinite. But what does this have to do with Determinatio negatio est? When we refer to a specific thing, say, the desk in front of us, we say: "That is a desk." And in doing so we negate it's being because in fact it is not a desk, but rather "God" or "the infinite substance" that stands before us.
Baruch Spinoza Wrote:With regard to the statement that figure is a negation and not anything positive, it is obvious that matter in its totality, considered without limitation [indefinitè consideratam], can have no figure, and that figure applies only to finite and determinate bodies. For he who says that he apprehends a figure, thereby means to indicate simply this, that he apprehends a determinate thing and the manner of its determination. This determination therefore does not pertain to the thing in regard to its being; on the contrary, it is its non-being. So since figure is nothing but determination, and determination is negation [Quia ergo figura non aliud, quam determinatio, et determinatio negatio est], figure can be nothing other than negation, as has been said.
Pay attention to the bolded part to get at Spinoza's meaning. Also this:
Baruch Spinoza Wrote:When we apprehend a finite thing, we see it as having a shape or figure. In so doing, we mark that thing off from other things, giving it a determination. But it only has being as part of the infinite matter from which it is now separated. So, its determination pertains to its non-being, not its being. So, as determination is a negation of being, and figure is a form of determination, figure is a negation.
So, in light of what I've provided here, how can you say: " The ‘determination’ considered herein is the mode of negation whereby a person originates an intentional act. Spinoza’s “determinatio negatio est” enunciates the realization that human determination to action is an entirely negative procedure"--????
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/97865/2/d...0final.pdf
