Ontological Disproof of God

[negatio]

Okay, asshole.

a).  The ‘determination’ considered herein is the mode of negation whereby a person originates an intentional act.  Spinoza’s “determinatio negatio est”  enunciates the realization that human determination to action is an entirely negative procedure; and, J.P. Sartre (1905-1980),    has given us a detailed description of the actual doubly nihilative process whereby human action upsurges ex nihilo. 

Determinatio negatio est has nothing to do with "human action being an entirely negative procedure." Sartre was speaking of human action. You are conflating the sentiments of Sartre and Spinoza in part "a)" of your proof. Remember: Sartre is a free willist. Spinoza is a hard determinist. You cannot equate the ideas of the two thinkers without first addressing the gap between determinism and free will. You've wholly ignored it.

Let's get into Determinatio negatio est. What does it mean? Well, it concerns being, not action. Let's take a look at the Ethics.

PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof.—There can only be one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.

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Definition II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.

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In short, the substance in the universe is necessarily infinite. He calls this substance "God" ... though this is the sort of God that even atheists believe in. It is in fact the whole of nature that Spinoza calls "God." And in the above quote, Spinoza thinks he's shown nature to be necessarily infinite. But what does this have to do with Determinatio negatio est? When we refer to a specific thing, say, the desk in front of us, we say: "That is a desk." And in doing so we negate it's being because in fact it is not a desk, but rather "God" or "the infinite substance" that stands before us.

With regard to the statement that figure is a negation and not anything positive, it is obvious that matter in its totality, considered without limitation [indefinitè consideratam], can have no figure, and that figure applies only to finite and determinate bodies. For he who says that he apprehends a figure, thereby means to indicate simply this, that he apprehends a determinate thing and the manner of its determination. This determination therefore does not pertain to the thing in regard to its being; on the contrary, it is its non-being. So since figure is nothing but determination, and determination is negation [Quia ergo figura non aliud, quam determinatio, et determinatio negatio est], figure can be nothing other than negation, as has been said.

Pay attention to the bolded part to get at Spinoza's meaning. Also this:

When we apprehend a finite thing, we see it as having a shape or figure. In so doing, we mark that thing off from other things, giving it a determination. But it only has being as part of the infinite matter from which it is now separated. So, its determination pertains to its non-being, not its being. So, as determination is a negation of being, and figure is a form of determination, figure is a negation.

So, in light of what I've provided here, how can you say: " The ‘determination’ considered herein is the mode of negation whereby a person originates an intentional act.  Spinoza’s “determinatio negatio est”  enunciates the realization that human determination to action is an entirely negative procedure"--????

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm

http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/97865/2/d...0final.pdf

Simply because Sartre, who mistakenly gave credit to Spinoza for "Omnis determination est negation.", which is Hegel's slight alteration/modification of Spinoza's dictum; so, Sartre failed to both to properly quote Spinoza, while, at the same time, giving Spinoza the credit for having originated an infinitely rich dictum.  I think it is high time not to leave what Spinoza actually said out, and, thereby, to leave Spinoza out of the most fantastically insightful insight ever perceived regarding our being within the form/void matrix.  I prefer to employ, as Sartre, failed to do , the briefer: determination is negation.  There is indubitably a connection between Sartre and Spinoza via the core of the dictum, which Hegel supplemented.  It does not matter that Spinoza was essentially teaching man what his figure/ground capacity is; Sartre is employing Spinoza's dictum for the sake of illuminating how the origin of a human act is a determination via negation, as well as determination via negation being the essence of perception. Negatio.  Make sense ?
Sartre saw that the explanation of the origin of human determination to act is contained within the core of Spinoza's dictum, (which, apparently Sartre only knew as Hegel's version of the dictum), thus my claim that Spinoza, indeed, via the infinitely rich being of his dictum, did, indeed, first, thereby, enunciate the originative mode of human action. And, in fact, if we are honest, and  no longer leave Spinoza out, and, admit that Spinoza's deep, deep, little dictum, does, indeed, ground all future realizations regarding our own human ontological structure, including my indefeasible enunciation of the fact that ''law" is not determinative of human action, because ''law'' a positive, given, past, being-in-itself, is, thereby,  not a nothingness which is determinative.