(December 1, 2018 at 11:32 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: A primer on mind dependence as it relates to moral theory.
Mind dependence, in moral theory, is not a comment on whether or not some proposition x exists in a mind. It is a comment on whether or not the thing to which it refer exists -solely- as an artifact of the mind that possesses it.
All propositions are "mind dependent" in a sense meaningless to moral theory, in that all moral propositions exist in our minds. This brute fact does not establish that they are neccessarrily subjective as a moral theorist is referring to subjectivity. Any moral proposition that exists in our minds but -also- refer to some fact of a matter beyond that mind is, in moral theory, an objectivist fact of the matter x.
So, two propositions. X is bad because I don't like it. X is bad because it hurts people. Both propositions exist as a product of minds, but only one of them is necesarrily subjective (again, as moral theorists are discussing it, it's objectively true that the first persons opinion is that they don;t like something). The other may be, insomuch as the person proposing it has gotten that fact wrong...but if that thing x does hurt people..regardless of whether or not our subject was aware of it or cared, it would still hurt people.
Since we weren't discussing morals but teleology, your digression, while cute, is rather irrelevant to the question under consideration.
And your belief that harm can be objectively described is a current point in contention, so asserting it here is just begging the question there.
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