What would be the harm?

[Angrboda]

If you're looking for what realists ground their moral systems in, it's just not the thing you thought it was, and intuitivism is the very first stop.  It's laying there under the notion of an observed fact, any observed fact, in and of itself.  There are other stops on that line, but I couldn't begin to establish any of them, anyway, if you have an issue with facts.  It doesn't require that you concede some argument over the nature of morality to concede that intuitivism is at least as compelling and at least as rational an explanation of harm as it is of anything else.  It may not be enough for you, it may not be enough for me, but it is sensible.  There's nothing obviously wrong with it, no fallacy in it's construction, etc.  You'd have to refer to intuitivism, yourself, if I asked you similar questions about the system you're using to object to intuitivism, ultimately.  

No, moral realists do not depend upon the type of argument you're engaged in here. Actual moral realists assert that there is some objective feature of the world which makes moral propositions true. Actual moral realists reject constructs such as yours and Harris' because they realize that harm and well-being are subjective and thus they don't pick out objective features of the world and so they cannot form the basis of any moral realism. As has been said of Harris, you think that you've solved the perennial problem of objectively grounding morals when instead you've simply done philosophy badly. And here we have you simply reasserting what has already been shown to be wrong. You're like Drich and Christians in thinking that simply reasserting something will make it true. You've even said as much with your claim about having continually posted the same thing. What you're not doing is actually answering objections, such as those given in my last post. You didn't answer any of the objections there, or my Yoda objection to your rebuttal to my point about whether a wound constitutes harm or not, you're simply repeating yourself like an idiot.

Take it away, again, webster.

: physical or mental damage or injury : something that causes someone or something to be hurt, broken, made less valuable or successful, etc.

• No harm was done.
  
• I never meant to do/cause you any harm. [=I never meant to harm/hurt you in any way]
  
• They threatened him with bodily harm.
  

[+] more examples

I was going to go through each of these, and I will in a limited fashion, but it's not really my job. Apparently you didn't learn nothing from your last attempt at this and think that simply repeating your prior argument will somehow magically make it right this time when it wasn't last time.

All of the definitions given above either lead nowhere or to something subjective. Why is damage or injury harm? Because they negatively impact the desired function of a system. You cannot damage a rock because a rock isn't a system and has no desired function. As shown with the bloke who shot himself in the face, damage or injury is only harm if it is negative, otherwise it is neither harm nor damage or injury. One simply has to consider it from a mereological perspective. Something is damaged or injured if some of its parts are missing or non-functional. How do we determine what are the appropriate and required parts of a thing? By reference to its intended function. I'm missing nine fingers. That's only damage if I want to do something with those nine fingers. And you chopping the fingers off a dead person isn't harm at all because you can't harm a dead person, regardless of whether you might through some teleological notion consider it damage or injury. So both damage and injury necessarily refer to the purpose or function of a thing, and that is a teleological notion, and not an objective definition.

Hurt is simply a a near synonym for harm which leads nowhere.

Broken again refers to function, and function is another teleological notion which relies on intent and so is subjective.

Made less valuable or successful? Please. These are obvious subjective measures. Value is subjective. What counts as success is subjective.

But we went through all this with your prior dictionary episode in which the definitions for bad were all shown to be subjective. As noted above, you're simply repeating the same wrong arguments, ignoring and not grappling with the objections, and walking away with a smile on your face thinking that you have done well. Instead, you're just behaving like an idiot. As noted, it's not my job to show that all of the above definitions ultimately rely on subjective ideas, but your job to show that any of these definitions have an objective measure as a measure of harm. Quoting the dictionary doesn't do that. That you think it would, especially given your prior failure at this is astounding.

Yes, I do think that you dismiss it out of a lack of satisfaction, particularly in that people have an idea of what an objective morality would be that is entirely more, and more satisfying, than what it actually is.  I don't think I've misunderstood any of your objections, I think that you misunderstand what moral theorists are discussing, and the related but distinct subjects that you've conflated for each other, and as though one created some necessary and troubling state of x for the other.  We could go over all of them, again, if you like.  Or, you could point to some specific thing that really irked you and I'll just say it again.

Why not, instead of repeating the assertions you've made before you try doing actual work and answering the objections given. We can start with my objection that a wound is not an example of harm if the person desired a wound in their face. Is that not true? You responded to the trailer and insurance example by claiming that it was not what you wanted. But that's just a subjective idea as to what should be desired, not an objective one. In the case of the man whose trailer you burned down, who collected the insurance money, you did him no harm but actually helped him. If harm is objective as you say, you need to show that the burned out trailer constitutes harm for the man who wanted his trailer burned down, because objective notions require the ability to show that someone was harmed in spite of them having a desire for the action to occur. Get to work and show that.

As to whether I dismiss it out of satisfaction, I'll tell you the same thing that I told Drich and Huggy, even if I had such feelings, it would be irrelevant to the discussion as appeal to motive is a fallacy. I've told you that it is not true. The only reason you are repeating the suggestion is because you need to find some explanation for my refusal to accept your assertions that doesn't involve those assertions being wrong. And so, obviously, you explain it by asserting and believing that my emotions and my feelings are interfering with my ability to reason properly about the subject. This story has only one purpose, to make you feel better about your conclusion that you are right and put away any doubts that you are wrong prompted by an intelligent and philosophically astute interrogator disagreeing with you. So far from me having such a motive, which you just dredged up out of your ass because you want or need it to be true, it's actually you that is showing himself to be lead around by his emotional needs and desires. And I'll tell you the same thing that I told Drich. Even if I had the motives you suggest that I have, it would not in any sense lead to the conclusion that those feelings were interfering with my ability to reason about the subject and come to correct conclusions. But the fact is it's not true, I don't have such feelings, and this bullshit is just a comforting story that you are telling yourself so that you can feel better.

And now you have joined the ranks of Drich and Huggy with the quality of your arguments. Proud of yourself?

Here, I'll add a new one.  A lion or a flesh eating bacteria most certainly wouldn't care whether or not I have a wound..but I'll still have one..I'll still have been harmed.  Is there some objection you'd like to field to this?  You're confusing agency and compulsion and caring, again, for the basis of both harm and objective moral propositions.  That is, again, simply not what realism..or I, am talking about.  I could, ofc, offer you many ways that realists handle those other things, but they are not the base of the realists moral position.  

You're still confused. It's not that you don't have a wound or that the bacteria or lion care about such, it's that a wound isn't harm unless its undesirable, and that makes the notion of harm subjective. A wound, by itself, without reference to the wants and desires of some thing is neither good or bad. Since it's neither good or bad on its own, it isn't harm because harm requires that it be bad (as well as your larger argument that harm is bad; if the wound isn't bad, and you consider the wound harm then that refutes your claim that harm is bad). You're also confused about who has the burden of proof here. You keep casting this as my attempting to prove that a wound has a subjective element and is therefore subjective. You're right that this would not show that it is subjective. However, I'm not saying that. What I am saying is that any reason you can give for considering any state of affairs harm or bad is subjective, and my pointing out those subjective aspects is simply to show that the things you think are objective actually are subjective. You haven't given me an example of objective harm, and until you do, all this talk of how these things are subjective and not objective is just refuting your attempts to prove your point, not my attempts to prove the reverse.

You talk about moral realists above without realizing that it is actual moral realists who have problems with notions such as yours and Harris' being valid examples of moral realism. I don't know exactly where the failure lies, but I suspect that you've mistaken common sense notions for the objective nature of harm or bad with actual philosophically rigorous ones. Actual moral realists realize that you can't define bad so simply and have an objective definition of it. That's why actual moral realists reject ideas like yours and Harris' because they see the problems with it even if you don't. You, in your delusion, think this is because you have succeeded where others have failed when in reality it's simply that you don't recognize that you have failed.

That something can be subjectively valued does not mean that the thing subjectively valued cannot be an objective thing.  There is no valid inference from one directly to the other.  It gives us reason, ofc, to go over our moral propositions to see if the specific example is, properly and meaningfully, ethically subjective..but it simply doesn;t help to establish that -all- moral values are subjective because some can be or because many are subjectively valued.  Realists also agree with you, additionally, that intersubjectivity is not objectivity.

No, that something can be subjectively valued does not mean that it cannot be an objective thing. I readily admit that it could be an objective thing. However, the fact that it could be an objective thing doesn't show that it is an objective thing. You have to remember context. You have been asked to show an example of harm that is objective and objectively bad. You gave subjective accounts of its badness, primarily by citing your desire to burn down my trailer house. I have, and will point out again, that your burning down my trailer house is only bad if you assume a certain perspective, and therefore it's only subjectively bad. This does not show that burning down the trailer is not objectively bad, but what it does show is that your wanting to burn down my trailer is not objectively bad, which is a refutation of your point. You're terribly confused about who is making the positive case. I am not trying to establish that all harm is subjective in the case that you cited but rather that you have not given an objective account of how burning down the trailer house is bad or harm. Those are your responsibilities, and you haven't fulfilled them.

Now, if you like, feel free to show how any of the above dictionary definitions are objectively bad and harmful. I suspect your primary attempt will be to focus on damage, but keep in mind the proviso above that damage isn't harm unless it's negative. That essentially simply loops us back to the concept of bad, which we've already been through once, and to which it seems your only reply is to again axiomatically assert that harm is bad. (And note that I don't need to show that damage has to be negative to qualify as harm even if the dictionary doesn't explicitly mention it because you do: you have asserted that harm is bad. If damage isn't bad, then by your own definition it isn't harm.)


Now, you've got a lot of work ahead of you, and as noted, I won't have many opportunities to read and respond for a few days, so you're on your own for a while. Make good use of your time. Do not simply reassert your prior failed arguments but actually tackle the substance of my rebuttals. And don't you worry about what motivates me, I'm a big girl and can handle myself, squirrely emotions and all, and besides, you've shown that you don't have the first clue about what I actually feel.