What would be the harm?

[Angrboda]

My version of moral realism is moral naturalism, not realist intuitivism (though, ultimately, Ill be reduced to it if you fight tooth and nail for no other reason than fighting tooth and nail, and you'' only be fighting tooth and nail by explicit reference to intuitions).  I'm noting that your -subjectivist- objections are toothless against both.  

I'll consider this later.

Can harm or damage be objective?  Yes.  Can they be natural properties?  Yes.  Done and done.  There is no more to -be- done.  You can still disagree in the end but you cannot rationally or sensibly disagree with either of these statements if you understand what moral theorists are discussing.  Subjectivist invocations are patently incapable.

No, you are wrong here because you are proposing a moral theory, that's why it's called moral realism. You might be able to establish that harm has an objective definition, even though you haven't done so yet. You may be able to show that harm and damage can be natural properties, though the problems there are already evident. In order for harm being bad to qualify as a moral theory you have to show, in addition to what you've provided, that harm is morally bad. If you're appealing to bad in any other sense, then you're equivocating. If you can't show that damage is morally bad, then either it doesn't qualify as harm in the sense you are trying to establish, or you have violated your own moral theory in asserting it as harm. Your only way out here is to accept that damage by itself does not qualify as harm, and moving on to something else to use in establishing that harm can be objectively defined, or demonstrate that damage is necessarily bad in the moral sense. Those are essentially the two options. There is no third option if you want to hold to the assertion that harm is objectively bad as the foundation of your moral realism. That you can't see this continues to astound me.

So, no, your belief that there is nothing more to be done represents two failures on your part. First, that you fail to recognize that you have not accomplished both, and second, that even if you had accomplished both, both combined are still not sufficient to establish your moral realism.