What would be the harm?

[The Grand Nudger]

Is a wound mind dependent, lol.  Yes or no. That's all that matters to ethical objectivity and subjectivity. That's the difference between them. There are many other ways to use either of those terms but this is the meaningful use in the context of realist and subjectivist moral propositions.

If I told you that my moral system was wound based, it would be an objective system, by definition.....even if it didn't satisfy either of us as a moral system. There would be no valid objection to the wound ala "yeah, but, wounds are just, like..your opinion, man". No, they are not. The objectivity of your run of the mill moral system is underwhelming, but it is objective. That's why they're called objective moral systems in the first place, instead of..just..like, our opinions, man.

As far as harris argument? Specify which part of the argument, because..as I've said more than once already..I don't think that -any- consequentialist argument fully succeeds. It won't surprise me to find that harris does a poor job in any particular (it's not exactly his wheelhouse), but if I knew which particular it was I could find you someone who states the same argument in a much more thorough way. Ultimately, the simplest response (in criticism) to any consequentialist argument is the same as the fundamental response to hedonism. It may be that pursuing the best consequence™ will not, in point of fact, yield that consequence. It could go south entirely, and yield the exact opposite. The subject of much dystopian fiction and a great many failed schemes irl. Note, in this, there's no need to launch some batshit objection on grounds of subjectivity. If the consequentialist is using objective metrics, then it's an objective consquentialism. If it's using -the wrong- objective metrics..it's still an objective consequentialism, but it's no longer a moral consequentialism. It becomes a run of the mill empirical plan. The open question applies. It becomes an instrumental good...good for - the ends of the plan, but not intrinsically good in a moral sense.

That sort of thing can be useful to some concept of intrinsic good, as the empirical observation of the boiled lobster helped some person to realize that what they were doing was wrong in our previous example, and that sort of thing opens itself up very well to empirical observation (which is why most versions of scientific realism include at least a tip of the hat)...but as described above, it has problems. What I've been trying to help you understand, is that those problems are not the problems you have been referring to. Problems of subjectivity, or problems of moral disagreement.

The only part of his argument that I can recall being satisfied with, on it's own grounds, is his opening intuitivist gambit. I see why he would want to do that, as well, establish some brute fact, any brute fact, from which to procede and and with which to make valid inferences. If he's wrong in that statement, it's nigh impossible to see how. The rest of his stuff may be soup sandwich, it may not follow, etc (I;m allowing for the possibility of my misremembering his presentation..because it did follow, though I saw him offer it up in a vid and not in the book - for all I know he made corrections after his big "send me your philosophy major hate mail" campaign). I do recall him becoming suddenly myopic after delivering it. We go from the greatest suffering of the greatest number of creatures or beings - asserting harm and creatures or beings that can be harmed as the morally relevant parties..but then decides that -human- well being is the metric or goal, later. That's pretty much trash, it expresses his personal bias as a human for humans....that much is certainly subjective in a meaningful sense, lol..and this bias causes an inconsistency between his initial principle and later statements and conclusions. Not really a lethal one, but irksome.