Defending Pantheism

[vulcanlogician]

You've left out the most important portion of pantheism in framing the discussion, why it's pan-theism- instead of pan-deism-, or just plain and simple atheism.  The immanence of divinity.  

I have a simpler and putatively more accurate term for all things, two of them, in fact.  The cosmos, and the universe.  Neither are an immanent manifestation of divinity.  Perhaps you can explain why I should regard the universe as an immanent manifestation of divinity when there is no evidence whatsoever to that effect?

Well, the universe actually exists. We can look around and see it (and -man!!- isn't it fucking amazing!?). We don't have to resort to reading ancient scriptures to find evidence that the pantheistic God exists. It is immediately available to the senses. It contains more power and love than any god a theist ever imagined. And it really is the source of all our joy, sorrow, indispensable moments, and numinous feelings.

As misplaced as a pantheist's reverence may be, at least is is aimed toward something that exists.

As a comment on the misplaced reverence and personification of the natural world,...

We already covered that before here. Pantheists don't anthropomorphize God. Below is a quote I've shared before. It is Spinoza's reasoning for why people think that God must be anthropomorphic. Here he really is trolling the theists.

Further, as [human beings] find ... many means which assist them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish... they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, ... they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together.

Spinoza, and I know we've had this convo before..was most likely a very clever atheist troll in a time when any divergence of belief was still a death sentence.  More than anything, he used his rhetorical device to criticize the foundational conceit in theological power structures of the time within the context of accepted and sanitized beliefs.

Maybe he was trolling a little bit. But the religious trolled him more than he ever trolled them. He was expelled from his Jewish community for having "dangerous ideas." He was attacked with a knife by a fanatic who shouted "heretic!" He was compelled to publish his greatest work posthumously. His books were banned across Europe. And this is a guy who everyone, even his outspoken critics, noted was a modest, gentle, and nonviolent person. He turned down teaching positions at prestigious schools so that he could concentrate on completing his work in philosophy. He supported himself by grinding lenses. If they really valued humility and righteousness, you'd think the Christians might have held him in high esteem. Instead he was attacked in the street by ranting bigots. He didn't troll them. They trolled him.

So, anyway. Post is long. Below I've included a passage from the Ethics that covers some of the supra-atheist thinking that he did. What do you make of it? Does it sound like straight atheism to you?

PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.—All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Corollary.—Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.

Proof.—The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Note.—It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.

PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return.

Proof.—For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V. xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.

Proof.—This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D.

https://www.fulltextarchive.com/page/The-Ethics1/