Defending Pantheism

[vulcanlogician]

I think this is key, and that it brings up all kinds of issues which are still current. It's not something we can dismiss based on five minutes of Googling. 

Since you're the only one of us who's actually read Spinoza, let me ask you: what is the best argument against his position? 

What he's dealing with is relevant to a number of problems which remain for us. For example:

~ the Hard Problem of consciousness
~ possible panpsychism
~ issues in physics where mind seems to influence or determine the behavior of matter

If we stop to debate each one of these it will derail the thread -- I know each has been done to death around here. And I'm sure that certain people will be more than willing to pronounce the Truth in regard to each one of these -- unjustified confidence is not in short supply. I'm only bringing them up to wonder if Spinoza-type monism would offer a solution to these, and if there is any reason to rule out such monism at this time? If we were convinced of his position, would it tie up these issues? 

And again, I know that according to the Immutable Laws of Internet Debate we have no burden of proof, and until Spinoza offers absolutely persuasive proof we have no obligations at all. But let's pretend we are people who, in good faith, would just like to know what's true, so we can skip debate dogma. What arguments do you know against monism?

Interesting. One thing that pops out to me is that I never considered Spinoza as a panpsychist! A cursory google search reveals that there are opposing views to whether he is or not, but panpsychism does gel with the rest of his metaphysics. But Leibnitz, to me, seems more the panpsychist. I never got a hint of panpsychism when I read Spinoza.

In opposition to this dualism, the psychist views of Spinoza (1632–77) and Leibniz (1646–1716) can be seen as attempts to provide a more unified picture of nature. Spinoza regarded both mind and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) of the eternal, infinite and unique substance he identified with God Himself. In the illustrative scholium to proposition seven of book two of the Ethics ([1677] 1985) Spinoza writes:

a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing … therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought … we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes….

We might say that, for Spinoza, physical science is a way of studying the psychology of God. There is nothing in nature that does not have a mental aspect—the proper appreciation of matter itself reveals it to be the other side of a mentalistic coin.

I like the part about Spinoza thinking that the physical sciences are a way of studying the psychology of God. But I think one must consider such a statement carefully. There is a woo woo way of reading that sentence, and a grounded way. Considering the rest of Spinoza's thought, I think the most reasonable interpretation is the latter.

What arguments do you know against monism?

Just the standard stuff. The first two chapters of Descartes' meditations could count as an argument against monism, I suppose. (If not the whole book...).

Then there's hylomorphism. But I (like one of my textbook authors) consider hylomorphism a "polite form of materialism." I don't think it contradicts materialism in any special way.

Property dualism, the most plausible of the dualisms, makes the argument "Hey! There is obviously some immaterial aspect of reality!" Hard to refute that, really. They are the "pure skeptics" of monism, I suppose. Cartesian dualism is something of a strawman these days. Property dualism is at least somewhat plausible.

Searle's biological naturalism is more materialist than non-materialist, but one might say his idea that consciousness is not ontologically reducible to physical states amounts to some sliver of dualistic thinking. Some accuse him of being a property dualist on that account.