(November 13, 2019 at 10:54 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote:(November 13, 2019 at 8:34 pm)Grandizer Wrote: Could you provide a concrete example or two to illustrate what you're saying? I'm not following you at this point. Counterexamples to X does not mean X is not contingently true.
In possible worlds semantics, they do - but not the way you're imagining, because possible worlds semantics don't work the way people expect and have absolutely nothing to do with any concrete world or example. In possible worlds semantics, the existence of one possible world in which there is no god doesn't alter the truth value of the statement, from possible worlds semantics, that if gods existence is necessary in one possible world it's necessary in all possible worlds. Nor would one possible world in which there is a god alter the truth value of the statement, from possible world semantics, that if it is necessarrily true in one possible world that there is no god, then it is necessarrily true in all possible worlds that there is no god. Those two statements are, however, counterexamples to each other, each from possible worlds semantics...and one....necessarrily makes the other false. Whichever one that may be.
Ok, sure. It could go one way or the other. Depends on the starting point we go with.
I'll get to the rest later.
