Jesus' Mission....

[GrandizerII]

@Grandizer

It's not knowledge because all possible choices are made in all possible worlds, with god arbitrarily selecting one of those multiple worlds for "actualization".  It didn't know which one you would choose beyond knowing that you would choose all options.  It merely selected one of all of the options you "chose".  The shots were fired, the holes were in the barn, and it drew a circle around them.  Again, though, irrelevant, as knowing that you would choose everything in a many worlds interpretation still includes the fatalist requirement that you would choose everything in many worlds interpretation.  You couldn't -not- choose everything, and your "choice", known from a past state, could have no other outcome.  The specific world privileged, itself and additionally, being outside of your influence or control.  You "chose" all the worlds, and you didn't choose the actualized one.

I disagree that it's not knowledge. If God knows what world it actualizes, it knows what choice ends up being actually made. It's not a guess, it's absolute knowledge. If you were to ask God what choice you would actually make in this world at some specific time, it would 100% be able to give you the correct answer (assuming God is willing to tell you the truth and all that).

And again, I disagree that the argument I'm making requires that the person choose everything. What it assumes is that the person has the potential to choose one of many options, but only one choice is made actual (in the case of only one world being actual).

I don't choose all the worlds, and I didn't choose the actual world either. But if the possibility of me making choices different from the one I end up making is "real", then that's where the so-called "free will" comes into being.

The definition I give for "free will" is one that virtually matches how philosophical libertarians tend to see it. So I don't agree that what I provided was a redefinition. I will grant you that the definition itself does not necessarily indicate true freedom of will, but we're assuming such a free will is somehow possible. Otherwise, there would be no point bothering to argue for its incompatibility with foreknowledge. Let's just say that such a notion of free will doesn't make sense then.