Question about "faith"

[Angrboda]

I think that you and I can do better than some boilerplate emotivist/cognitivist bit

You answered your own question in asking it, anyway.  -If- we have no other way of "knowing", than feeling like we know, then we don't know anything.  There are no true cognitive statements.  "I am alive" is not knowledge, it's not true - it's just a feeling.

Again, knowledge and faith are not equivalent, and no amount of unfortunate mistakes or happy accidents of knowledge and faith could make it otherwise.  Even in the case of our having nothing other than feelings - that would be us being incapable of knowledge, not the two being equivalent.  There's more than a little bit of irony in a disagreement (or in questions over a disagreement) from a non-cognitivist pov, don't you think?  Are you expecting a position informed by facts from a creature incapable of knowledge?  Something logical that proceeds from true (or at least sound) cognitive propositions?

Engaging in the discussion, all by itself, reduces the objection to a stolen concept.  Requiring the truth of what we're arguing against.  We'd have to require the proposition "we know what we know on account of feeling like we know" to be cognitively true.  This sort of objection well and truly reduces to a comment on how, on account of some people being bad at math, there is no fact of two and two.  It's true enough of people, but not true of facts, or of two and two.

Well, that's interesting and all, but I don't see that as an answer to my question. Are you or are you not drawing a categorical distinction between propositions we believe to be true because we feel like we know that they are true and some other category of propositions which we hold to be true, but by some other means? If you aren't asserting such a distinction, then I have misunderstood you, and we'll have to back up and try to reach some level of mutual understanding. If you are asserting such a categorical distinction, then you need to produce it.