(September 1, 2021 at 1:10 pm)Neo-Scholastic Wrote:(September 1, 2021 at 11:51 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: To return to Searle, conscious states are causally reducible to brain states (I agree with that). But they aren't ontologically reducible (because of qualia). So the point is: reductionism fails here.
Is it fair to say that according to Searle, brain-states are necessary, but insufficient causes for qualitative experiences?
That's a really good question. And I'm not 100% sure he'd agree with that assessment.
Searle's position (Biological Naturalism) says pretty much what I said before: conscious states are causally reducible to brain states, but not ontologically reducible. He does concede this irreducibility. But I want to say ultimately he thinks brain states are sufficient.
There is some ambiguity... or at least something unresolved in Searle's position... hence Feser's accusation that Searle is a property dualist. (An accusation Searle denies, of course.)