Descartes laid out the mind-body problem for us. His solution to it, substance dualism, is lacking. But he asked the right questions, at least. Functionalism, if anything, is an answer to those questions. Substance dualism relies on folk intuitions. But the mind-body problem itself may not. I mean, there is a mystery there, isn't there? And we can't explore that mystery without covering the territory first travelled by Descartes.
Qualia doesn't demand an explanation. Conscious experience demands an explanation. Qualia is simply something we march out in front of those who say there is a 1:1 reduction between conscious states and brain states.
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Are beliefs a thing? Well, in a metaphysical sense, they are. I have a belief that my car is parked in my driveway. The cause of this belief is the firing of neurons in my brain. But what the belief says (its truth-value, etc.) is not determined by looking at my neurons. The belief has a metaphysical structure, and you determine the truth value of it by looking at the structure of the belief, and comparing it to the physical world (ie. by looking at my driveway) to see if it's true. For this reason I want to say beliefs (and by proxy, memories) are on different ontological ground than qualia. "Caused by brain states" is the only common denominator.
Qualia doesn't demand an explanation. Conscious experience demands an explanation. Qualia is simply something we march out in front of those who say there is a 1:1 reduction between conscious states and brain states.
***
Are beliefs a thing? Well, in a metaphysical sense, they are. I have a belief that my car is parked in my driveway. The cause of this belief is the firing of neurons in my brain. But what the belief says (its truth-value, etc.) is not determined by looking at my neurons. The belief has a metaphysical structure, and you determine the truth value of it by looking at the structure of the belief, and comparing it to the physical world (ie. by looking at my driveway) to see if it's true. For this reason I want to say beliefs (and by proxy, memories) are on different ontological ground than qualia. "Caused by brain states" is the only common denominator.
