(November 15, 2011 at 12:09 am)MysticKnight Wrote: What am I'm saying is that we know God is possible while we don't know if it's possible that God doesn't exist.
The former implies the later. Possible means it could be true and it could be false. Otherwise it's called 'true'/'false'. If you define it as true/false, you're begging the question.
(November 15, 2011 at 12:09 am)MysticKnight Wrote: Perhaps existence is impossible without God.
Perhaps existence is impossible without my dog peeing on a lamppost.
(November 15, 2011 at 12:09 am)MysticKnight Wrote: However God being possible in some possible world W, to me is obviously possible.
You are confusing the term possible used in the argument for a second term.
God being possible in a possible world means: we can premise that God exists in a possible (your second term) world, and we can premise that God does not exist in a possible (your second term) world. Both premises are possible (your first term).
This is what makes the S5 axiom so trivial regarding such general truths: one can potentially create an infinite regress of worlds and define the rules to be whatever one wants. I eluded to this in my earlier post.
Observe:
Quote:1. God is a being that, if it exists, it exists necessarily (premise 1)
2.1 There is a possible world, P_{-N}, in which one can premise that either there is a possible world P_{1} in which God exists or there is a possible world P_{2} in which God does not exist. (premise 2.1)
2.2 There is a possible world, P_{-N+1}, in which one can not premise that there is a possible world, P_{-N}, in which one can premise that either there is a possible world P_{1} in which God exists or there is a possible world P_{2} in which God does not exist. (premise 2.2)
...
2.2N There is a possible world, P_{N}, in which... there is a possible world, P_{-N+1}, in which one can not premise that there is a possible world, P_{-N}, in which one can premise that either there is a possible world P_{1} in which God exists or there is a possible world P_{2} in which God does not exist. (premise 2.2N)
...
and so on.
The end point being: the ontological argument is arbitrary nonsense.
