Modal ontological argument

[GrandizerII]

If, in any constructed proof in any logic system, the axia can be doubted, then the conclusion can be safely doubted. This seems to be the fundamental weakness of ontological attempts at proving God.

What can be reasonably doubted about Axiom S5?

-I can easily imagine a possible world in which a being could not be omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.

It's not about whether you can imagine such a world as it's not about logical possibility here.

The question is, is such a being metaphysically possible and therefore metaphysically necessary? In other words, is it possible for such a being to be rooted in reality?

-It is not readily apparent that possibility of a maximally great being entails the existence of a maximally great being.

The underlying logic entails that anything that is possibly necessary exists in the actual world as it exists in all possible worlds (including the actual world).

The maximally great being, according to Plantinga, is intuitively seen as a necessary being.

It strikes me that Anselm and all of his philosophical descendants have taken great pains to ensure that they set the parameters they need to achieve the conclusion they want (and no other). Let's set different parameters to see how silly the whole thing is:

-A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it has long ears, eats clover, and hops about in W.

(leaving out the middle bits)

-Therefore, rabbits are maximally great beings.

No theist accepts that a maximally great being is physical. To the typical theist, anything that is physical is contingent, not necessary. Therefore, to the theist, such a being that you speak of is not necessary and therefore not maximally great.

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What does it mean to be "maximally great"?  I think that the whole argument falls on its face at Premise 1.

To Plantinga, a maximally great being is a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, and is so in all possible worlds.