RE: Modal ontological argument
February 2, 2022 at 9:51 am
(This post was last modified: February 2, 2022 at 9:53 am by Belacqua.)
(February 2, 2022 at 9:41 am)Angrboda Wrote: Meh. It's basically an analytic truth that if a necessary being exists in one possible world it exists in all possible worlds, as that's what to be necessary means. The big question is whether it does exist in some possible world which is equivalent to asking whether the idea of a maximally excellent being is coherent. I'd say no.
But there's another way to tackle it. Suppose that it is possible that there never was anything, that nothing ever existed. Is this possible? Of course. If that's the case then it's trivial to produce a modal ontological disproof of God.
1. There exists a possible world in which nothing exists;
2. If nothing exists in some possible world then a maximally excellent being does not exist in that world;
3. If a maximally excellent being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in all possible worlds;
4. Therefore, a maximally excellent being does not exist in this world.
If absolutely nothing exists in a world (including space, time, laws of nature, etc.) can that world be said to exist?
