Modal ontological argument

[GrandizerII]

On the question of whether the possibility of the existence of a maximally great being (as per P1 of the MOA) is meant to be understood as logical possibility vs. metaphysical possibility, theists like WLC seem to be suggesting they're referring to metaphysical possibility as opposed to logical.

See this quote for example:

As for the atheist’s retort that it’s not self-contradictory to say, “God does not exist,” this is irrelevant because the argument is framed in terms of broadly logical possibility/necessity, not narrowly or strictly logical possibility/necessity. There’s no contradiction in asserting “The Prime Minister is a prime number,” but that hardly shows that such a statement is possibly true in the relevant sense (that there is a possible world in which that statement is true). The atheist has to maintain that the idea of maximal greatness is broadly logically incoherent, like the idea of a married bachelor. But the idea of maximal greatness seems perfectly coherent and therefore possible—which entails that maximal greatness is exemplified!

Here, broadly logical possibility seems to mean the same as metaphysical possibility.