Euthyphro dilemma asked for evolution.

[genkaus]

I would agree, which is precisely the reason I'm always looking for one of those facts when these sorts of discussions begin. On the other hand, the morality we have doesn't seem to be based on facts (nor does it seem to need to be based on facts for it to be operable). What with this hit-or-miss morality being the only one we've ever seen, I'm the kind of person that requires a little more in the way of "hey maybe, if and if and if". But I know we're just brainstorming it here, and that you haven't claimed to have found any of these moral facts definitively. So no worries on that count.

No, our current morality is not based on facts, but still hits some of the same points as objective morality.

Well now wait a minute, maybe I was wrong above. You do have an idea as to where we might look, is this as far as you have taken it, or have you isolated a moral fact?

Some of them. See the premises given below.

Agreed, a stickler might ask you if you have ever experienced a thought that did not arise from your mind, but we'd be splitting hairs at that point.

A stickler might answer that some of the thoughts may be borrowed form other minds. But that is irrelevant.

A minor point of contention here, reality may not be able to be anything but logical, but this does not mean that what we currently perceive as logical is the end all be all, and our large collection of logical fallacies attests to our ability to get the whole logic bit wrong. Again, it would be a case of "so far as we know". I don't have a problem with this, but again, keep in mind that you and I aren't the only ones in this discussion and such a thing might fly completely unnoticed by Mystic, for example, who asserts a universal unchanging and absolute something or other of morality.

Ofcourse it'd be contingent upon "as far as we know". Do you know of any knowledge that is not?

Whoa there, not because you say so Genk. We have every reason to believe that many of our "moral considerations" weren't the product of some well reasoned or well considered process. I concede that these things would not be a part of what constitutes morality to you, but this ad hoc morality does exist whilst yours is still only hypothetical. We don't judge them, but that doesn't necessarily mean that we shouldn't. That's classic is-ought, or am I mistaken? Not that our ad hoc morality isn't in the same boat, mind you.

No, its not so because I say so, it is so because that is how we define a moral agent. A being which cannot consider its actions cannot be a moral agent. Whether or not "moral considerations" are a product of reasoned or considered process or not is irrelevant, since it is not the process that requires consideration but the actions of the agent.

I'm not sure that the fingerprints analogy is a very good one, fingerprints are material, demonstrable, etc.... and we're talking perceptions of what does or does not constitute "morality".

Notice that I talked about the pattern of fingerprints, not the fingerprints themselves. Any pattern is a mental construct, albeit one based on objective and demonstrable facts.

This is the part I love. I like the first one, however, is morality a guide or is it merely the sum total of how we do act? Judging from existent moralities the lines seem blurry, and this is only my opinion.

According to the current definition of morality, it is a guide.

A moral agent could also be absolutely dead and avoid coming into conflict with this code as often as a living moral agent -that's just an amusing thing that comes to mind, not really any sort of criticism.

Amusing - but incorrect. A dead moral agent is a contradiction.

So, in the business of establishing these as moral facts aren't you going to be haunted by the same thing that haunted you the last time we invoked moral agents, and the conditions for being classified as a moral agent? Wouldn't those have to be definitively shown?

Yes, they would.

We can't be ad hoc rationalizers, if this proclamation is to be all-encompassing, can we? I can't say that I find too much in the way of issues with where this is going, once we concede that there is possibly such a morality, that there are possibly moral agents, the third seems to come out of left field but the second would follow by definition. Thing is, and I think I've found a way to rephrase that question above, are we entirely certain that we aren't working backwards on this, we know what we want to assert, and so we propose a definition that would allow us to do so?

Given that I started with the definitions - of morality and moral agents - I can say pretty confidently that is not the case.

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I might argue that a code of conduct is already a evolved response to morality at its most basic. I would argue morality at its most basic is an semi-instinctive, semi-taught perception that if one were to do certain thing, it would lead in some vaguely defined way to something bad happening to oneself.

Since we are all born of more or less similar genetic material, most of us probably respond in some grossly similar way to action with the same perceived effect on us. This allows some pragmatic rules to be conecived and adapted that would maximize individual's odds of prospering within his social network. I suspect "this will down like a lead balloon with a whole bunch of people from whom I might need favors" was the original basis of morality.

I'd disagree, and so would the encyclopedia:

The term “morality” can be used either

1. descriptively to refer to some codes of conduct put forward by a society or,
some other group, such as a religion, or
accepted by an individual for her own behavior or
2. normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

You can always caveat each arbitrary part of any morality such that it
would never explicit conflict with any other part. I suspect this pragmatic caveatinbg is necessary in any practical system of morality that could survive against competing systems of morality.

For example, a system of consistent morality that consistently forbids use of war to pursue desired goals will probably not last indefinitely against an otherwise comparable system that says "but war is permissible if it will get you want you want".

In case of objective morality, any such caveats themselves would have to be reasoned and shown to be logical. You ignore the fact that these caveats too must be judged on their merits and hence cannot be arbitrarily chosen.

Am I missing the part that specify what is meant by "objective"?

Are you? Do you not consider the stated precondition to be an objective fact?