(June 13, 2012 at 3:04 pm)Rhythm Wrote: -Good ole life and liberty. Those two are present in some systems, though not all, and we consistently violate both of them when the legal structure built around our morality has been violated.
Would it be fair to say that if a person did not adhere to this objective morality that they no longer deserved consideration as a moral agent? What then? Not really a problem for objective morality, obviously, I'm just interested.
I guess so.
(June 13, 2012 at 3:04 pm)Rhythm Wrote: -Like I said, I'll give you the alive bit, hows about free to act? Deja-vu time.
See below.
(June 13, 2012 at 3:04 pm)Rhythm Wrote: -You're screwing with me right? I didn't realize that we were actually discussing facts yet, we hadn't gotten past your definitions, caveats, and propositions.
Which point are you addressing here?
(June 13, 2012 at 3:04 pm)Rhythm Wrote: -But does the concept as we are now describing or refining it match observations of the object we are attempting to describe with it? There are only so many ways I can word this.
Clearly it does, or that word would not be applicable here.
(June 13, 2012 at 3:04 pm)Rhythm Wrote: -You say that we do, but I think the jury is still out on that one Genk. That's not the striongest criticism inm any case, we could act in accordance to any given moral principle completely by accident (or even in ignorance of that principle). Your definition for objective morality and moral agents seems to me to imply not only the rules of the game but the process one must use to arrive at conclusions that are in accordance with the rules of the game. Hard, scary determinism rears it's ugly head here.
We could is not an argument for whether or not we do. Besides, even within determinism, the capacity to reason and consider is not negated.
(June 13, 2012 at 3:04 pm)Rhythm Wrote: -I wouldn't doubt that we seem to perceive our actions as rational, reasoned, or considered, and I wouldn't doubt that we perceive ourselves as capable of looking back upon our actions or spit-balling our potential future actions, but you have to escape determinism Genk. You have to show that we aren't just rationalizing things after the fact. You said that this morality would be based in demonstrable facts and observations, not "hey, don't you agree with me?" or "hey, we seem to think this is the case, for the most part, so lets run with it". Maybe I'm not making myself clear here, I'm very, very friendly towards the idea, but I'd like to see some of those things you said this morality would or could be.
Any conflict with determinism would come in only if according to determinism, we did not have the capacity to reason or consider our actions. That fact that you accept that we do have the capacity to "rationalize after the fact", means reasoning and considering is possible even within whatever version of determinism you subscribe to. Secondly, that we "rationalize our actions after the fact" argument may apply to short term, singular actions like standing up or picking up an object, but it is simply not applicable to a series of connected actions all of which lead to a singular goal.
(June 13, 2012 at 3:04 pm)Rhythm Wrote: -Two distinct statements, yes, but very much related to the morality in question, and our ability to be moral agents. Look at all of the possibilities you've just offered. I'm assuming that your position is B, now explain to me why b is the case, and not a, c, or d.
As I have said repeatedly, B is not the case currently, since we do not have a complete picture of an objective moral code. In most cases it is a) and in other it is d). In some rare ones, it might be c).
(June 13, 2012 at 3:04 pm)Rhythm Wrote: -I hereby define blueberry waffles as a small firearm designed to be held in one hand. Here's the trouble, blueberry waffles already carries connotations, other definitions have been offered, why should you choose mine over theirs (and is it possible that when i say "blueberry waffles" I'm actually referring to something else entirely? You say morality is a guide, but someone in the field of evolutionary biology , specifically someone who studies the possible reasons for our behavioral tendencies with regards to the same might tell you that morality is the expression of behaviors which have led to survival advantages over other populations (I only choose this because we see it so often on these boards, there are countless ideas as to what morality is, in addition to their being countless ideas as to what is moral or immoral). You could still say that morality -should be- a guide, even if it currently isn't, but wouldn't that kind of a distinction be useful? Im not asking you to prove to me that bachelors are unmarried, because that is an issue that rests on definition alone. I'm asking you to prove to me that your definition of -morality as a guide- is more accurate than any other definition of morality, because the definition of morality (what it is and isn't) isn't so decided as you seem to be insisting (as far as I'm aware, obviously).
The definition of a word can vary depending on the context and currently we are discussing it in a philosophical forum. So, I consider the definition given with respect to philosophy to be the most relevant and accurate for this discussion.
Now, put that aside for a moment and see if the same definition cannot apply to evolutionary biology as well. We have defined morality as a "code of conduct" or "a guide on how one should act" (the most generic definition). Putting aside any and all philosophical connotations that are implicit (such as application to moral agents), consider the definition form a biologist's point of view. A biologists sees animals behaving (acting) consistently. Those actions are geared towards a particular goal (survival). And although the specifics may differ from situation to situation, the actions seem to follow a set of specific principles. When we look for a concept within the language that most closely matches the given observations, we come up with "morality". However, since not every aspect of human morality is compatible with the observations here (such as conscious consideration of actions), we make a distinction between the two. The definition at its most basic, however, still applies.