Euthyphro dilemma asked for evolution.

[genkaus]

Due to whatever demonstrable facts about human beings and their nature/circumstance are different, was what I took from that (and perhaps I'm mistaken). This is precisely why I cast the shadow of doubt over what our nature or circumstances might be.

If you have any reason to doubt that rationality is a part of human nature, then that'd be a different conversation.

The desktop pc's in my example were communicating heuristic solutions between each other, but that did not alter the fact that they were heuristics. Whether or not something is a heuristic has everything to do with the process involved, not whether or not the solution is communicable. Heuristics can be communicated, and in some cases directly require communication as a component of the heuristic. If we wish to invoke the results oriented argument that a heuristic is no longer a heuristic when it is applied by a given agent for a specific goal..well, we haven't actually established that it isn't a heuristsic, because heuristics are also employed by given agents for a given goal. They can also be employed with no direction on the part of the user and they will still achieve a result (this is one of the poiunts in favour of morality evolving out of a hueristic process, for example, as the environment is providing both the problem, the process, and the range of possible solutions). The process is important, and I don't think we disagree here, because you place heavy emphasis on the process of logic in establishing an objective morality. I think our disagreement lies more along the lines of how much impact heuristics or any possible moral heuristics would have on our observations of what morality is (though I would definitely concede that this is not morality as you define it-though I'm not entirely ceratin how you can divorce yourself from morality -as is- merely by definition whilst simultaneously appealing to fact, or reality, or logic, considering that morality already "exists" and may not be what you have defined it to be...). Have we moved beyond trial and error, or are we merely discusing two competing "trial and error" responses to the same question? I'm not sure the two of us will find common ground on this one.

Exactly what argument are you trying to make here and how does it address the argument I presented (that we've moved past heuristics).

The "but since it is" bit would need more in the elaboration dept (for me). I wasn't aware that anyone had any definitive answer with regards to what morality was, but I may be mistaken.

Morality is a guide to how person should act - what he should and should not do - that much is established. Given that we have countless philosophies trying to answer not only what we should do, but why should we do it (based on different starting premises), I'd say we no longer determine morality by trial and error.

I agree, in both cases it was an issue of "save as many lives as you can" that the experiment seemed to imply that a heuristic was being employed to determine which of the two options presented was the best course of action would, to me, seem to have implications as to the process being employed in how we go about applying our morality, whatever the hell it may be. I think the process is important, and I think any definitions of what morality is and whether or not we are moral agents that ignores this is merely sweeping difficult problems under the rug.

The process of how we apply morality would not be relevant to what morality is and whether we are moral agents. It'd would be relevant to us, but not in context of those questions. That's because the identification of morality and us being a moral agent would always come before the question of its application.

You did define it as such, but I have repeatedly called into question your definition, and the only response offered thusfar is directly equivalent to "It is what it is because I have said that it is". Well, it may be, but you'd have to demonstrate that, if you want to invoke facts, observations, and reality, wouldn't you (and I think you made it explicitly clear that your objective morality would do so)? I think the best way to consider my opposition here isn't so much as a disagreement, but as a platform or invitation to elaborate upon your definition of morality and why it is the definition we should run with.

The problem is I'm not the one who defined it as such. I accepted the definition as laid out here - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

As to the reason I chose this definition, its because other sources often lead to circular reasoning - defining morality as difference between right and wrong and defining right and wrong as what is and is not morally acceptable.

Excellent, but you still haven't dismissed the heuristics except by definition (which I have repeatedly questioned), and to me, that's not exactly compelling, but again, we don't seem likely to find common ground on this one (because we appear to have unbelievably divergent definitions for what is or is not a heuristic to begin with).

Answering morally relevant questions using heuristics (trial and error) would be time-consuming and prone to error (since what worked once may not work again). Using rational analysis would not only lead us to what works, but also why it works, which leaves us better equipped to reason why it wouldn't work in another scenario. Which is why a heuristic based morality would not be preferable given the possibility of a reasoned one.

Now, the origin of morality may be considered heuristic in nature because at that time humans (or rather our ancestors) did not have the rational capacity for that kind of judgment. But once we had that capacity, we started using that for establishing moral concepts. And thus came long lines of philosophers and theologians telling people what they should do and why they should do it. Their differences came not from trying different things towards the same goals, but from different goals themselves.

Are you in the "happy and fulfilling life" camp yourself?

I am.

Personally, if I were to suggest a goal, it would be the perpetuation of human life.

Do you have a justification for that - as to why everyone should work towards perpetuation of human life? Rather why human life should be perpetuated at all?

I'm not sure that I could demand happiness of any objective morality because happiness is one of those things that almost inevitably leads to conflict when two peoples interest collide (even if the two people in question agree on "the principles of happiness" to begin with, and as you've said, people have some strange ideas of "happiness" we would have to contend with).

Not inevitably and within objective morality there would be provisions for such conflicts. Remember, while "happy and fulfilling life" is the goal, there still isn't a guarantee that the goal would be achieved.

Then we have to start making even more difficult arguments. Morality, to me, must be practical. It can't be so difficult to employ that we have to agonize over the details every time we go about making a moral decision, or else the heuristics (as I understand them) start to look a hell of alot more worthwhile.

This would speak to the analogy drawn in the other thread between morality and language. Morality could be complex, nuanced and detailed, but once you start practicing it, its application would become easier and easier. Consider the parallel of the English language. If you had to put down each and every you've learned about its rules, you' probably fail miserably. But that doesn't stop you from using it correctly everyday.