Justification for Foundational Belief

[Angrboda]

I'm not going to respond to your points, Genkaus, part because I didn't see that you had any, but more because I wish not to tarry here unnecessarily. Miles to go before I sleep.


In response to Skepsis' question about foundationalism, it would seem that foundationalism faces a difficult dilemma. As far as I can see, it can assert that certain concepts are basic and acceptable without proof by virtue of their having certain properties or existing in certain relationships or whatnot (such as being "self-evident," or perhaps "being capable of being asserted without contradiction" [Kant?]). However, this ultimately appeals to the notion that some ideas, concepts or beliefs are properly basic to us — that what appears as properly basic is what appears to our mind as properly basic. However, what appears as properly basic, to us, in one view, is simply a result of the stochastic process of evolution, which, on theory and ex hypothesi, did not necessarily give those concept or beliefs the appearance that they were properly basic because they are properly basic, but rather because they fit in some evolutionary process like a key to a lock. The specifics of which concepts and beliefs appear properly basic to us, are actually not properly basic, both because they are dependent on an even more fundamental process, and, because evolution didn't select their appearance of being properly basic on account of the truth of their being properly basic, but more than likely because of some instrumental utility involved. Thus, depending on their appearance to us is both ill founded and neglectful of the larger picture in which, our basic concepts, are essentially arbitrary whims of nature, and fundamentally without meaning "as basic concepts".

The other horn of the dilemma is even less inviting. The alternative is to appeal to the notion that the basic concepts and such are properly basic in the sense that they are objectively properly basic, and not dependent on the vagueries of the specific type of mind and its origins in biology. Ignoring for a moment the somewhat questionable notion of a basic concept existing independent of a mind — concepts are mind stuff, they exist nowhere else — it seems this approach is fundamentally just a variant of Platonism, in which certain ideas or forms exist in a realm independent of reality, yet somehow accessible to, and influential upon that reality. The two major problems there would be, first, that it is essentially a form of dualism, complete with all the philosophical problems or hurdles faced by any form of dualism. And second, even aside from the problems, nominalism appears to be the front runner in the war of ideas, and likely for good reason.

If there's an alternative that I am neglecting here, please point it out. However, failing a more attractive alternative, I'd say this dilemma is a foundering point for foundationalism.


(Somewhere in there, I was going to insert a comment on , as it essentially captures the question of foundationalism in compact form, but I don't remember what I wanted to say about it. I would recommend reading the Wikipedia article on it if you are not already familiar with the Trilemma.)