Justification for Foundational Belief

[Whateverist]

In response to Skepsis' question about foundationalism, it would seem that foundationalism faces a difficult dilemma. As far as I can see, it can assert that certain concepts are basic and acceptable without proof by virtue of their having certain properties or existing in certain relationships or whatnot (such as being "self-evident," or perhaps "being capable of being asserted without contradiction" [Kant?]). However, this ultimately appeals to the notion that some ideas, concepts or beliefs are properly basic to us — that what appears as properly basic is what appears to our mind as properly basic. However, what appears as properly basic, to us, in one view, is simply a result of the stochastic process of evolution, which, on theory and ex hypothesi, did not necessarily give those concept or beliefs the appearance that they were properly basic because they are properly basic, but rather because they fit in some evolutionary process like a key to a lock. The specifics of which concepts and beliefs appear properly basic to us, are actually not properly basic, both because they are dependent on an even more fundamental process, and, because evolution didn't select their appearance of being properly basic on account of the truth of their being properly basic, but more than likely because of some instrumental utility involved. Thus, depending on their appearance to us is both ill founded and neglectful of the larger picture in which, our basic concepts, are essentially arbitrary whims of nature, and fundamentally without meaning "as basic concepts".

This horn of the dilemma was essentially my objection. The other horn seems totally out of reach given that we only have our one example of symbolic language using minds to go on. Speculating what would be true for any such would be folly.

Thanks, Apo. I learn a lot from you.