(July 27, 2012 at 11:35 pm)apophenia Wrote: I'm not going to respond to your points, Genkaus, part because I didn't see that you had any, but more because I wish not to tarry here unnecessarily. Miles to go before I sleep.
I would like a response to the following two points, if you don't mind:
1. The question I would ask here is which theory of truth would be meaningful if the premises of evidentialism are vacated?
2. How do you address the argument of inescapable premises in support of foundationalism?
(July 27, 2012 at 11:35 pm)apophenia Wrote: In response to Skepsis' question about foundationalism, it would seem that foundationalism faces a difficult dilemma. As far as I can see, it can assert that certain concepts are basic and acceptable without proof by virtue of their having certain properties or existing in certain relationships or whatnot (such as being "self-evident," or perhaps "being capable of being asserted without contradiction" [Kant?]). However, this ultimately appeals to the notion that some ideas, concepts or beliefs are properly basic to us — that what appears as properly basic is what appears to our mind as properly basic. However, what appears as properly basic, to us, in one view, is simply a result of the stochastic process of evolution, which, on theory and ex hypothesi, did not necessarily give those concept or beliefs the appearance that they were properly basic because they are properly basic, but rather because they fit in some evolutionary process like a key to a lock. The specifics of which concepts and beliefs appear properly basic to us, are actually not properly basic, both because they are dependent on an even more fundamental process, and, because evolution didn't select their appearance of being properly basic on account of the truth of their being properly basic, but more than likely because of some instrumental utility involved. Thus, depending on their appearance to us is both ill founded and neglectful of the larger picture in which, our basic concepts, are essentially arbitrary whims of nature, and fundamentally without meaning "as basic concepts".
The other horn of the dilemma is even less inviting. The alternative is to appeal to the notion that the basic concepts and such are properly basic in the sense that they are objectively properly basic, and not dependent on the vagueries of the specific type of mind and its origins in biology. Ignoring for a moment the somewhat questionable notion of a basic concept existing independent of a mind — concepts are mind stuff, they exist nowhere else — it seems this approach is fundamentally just a variant of Platonism, in which certain ideas or forms exist in a realm independent of reality, yet somehow accessible to, and influential upon that reality. The two major problems there would be, first, that it is essentially a form of dualism, complete with all the philosophical problems or hurdles faced by any form of dualism. And second, even aside from the problems, nominalism appears to be the front runner in the war of ideas, and likely for good reason.
If there's an alternative that I am neglecting here, please point it out. However, failing a more attractive alternative, I'd say this dilemma is a foundering point for foundationalism.
(Somewhere in there, I was going to insert a comment on , as it essentially captures the question of foundationalism in compact form, but I don't remember what I wanted to say about it. I would recommend reading the Wikipedia article on it if you are not already familiar with the Trilemma.)
I disagree with your explanation of the second horn. Why wouldn't it be possible for a concept to be objectively properly basic while remaining independent of the vagaries of specific type of mind and its origins and requiring the existence of a thing such as a mind? I agree that concepts would not exist without the existence of a mind - but dependence on mind and dependence on a particular type of mind are two different things.
For example, the sense of sight is basically perception of a particular range of the electromagnetic spectrum. While the origins and biology and subsequent vagaries might grant different ranges to different beings, the basis behind it remains the same. Similarly, these concepts can be properly basic even if they depend upon the existence of a mind since they remain independent of specific types of minds.
