Hi, I'm a Christian

[CliveStaples]

Belief and knowledge are different things.

Not to most of the dropkick believers we get here. They actually say things like "I KNOW there is a God", then get their knickers all out of focus when anyone demands they prove that claim.

Well, 'knowledge' is traditionally defined (going back to Plato) as "justified true belief". This in turn requires a theory of justification that details what it means for a belief to be "justified".

So when you demand that someone prove a claim, there is an implicit assumption of what exactly constitutes a "proof".

But if A and B disagree regarding theories of justification, then what constitutes proof for A might be different than what constitutes proof for B.

Not quite;this atheist asserts only "there is no credible evidence for the existence of god. [ of which I am aware] I make no claims. To assert "I know" is to make a positive claim,which attracts the burden of proof.

I disagree; I think that anyone who makes a claim has the burden of supporting it. If I'm going to say, "There isn't any evidence that the world is round," I need to support my characterization of the available evidence.

Any competent apologist or theologian can present rational,logically valid arguments for their beliefs . However,logic does not guarantee truth. A valid logical inference is true if and only if the premise is true. What no theologian or apologist has yet presented is credible evidence or proof of any of their religious claims.

That is demonstrably false. Consider the following:

i. P (premise)
ii. P -> Q (premise)
iii. Therefore, Q (conclusion)

This is a valid logical argument; if P and (P -> Q) are both true, then Q must also be true. However, it is not necessarily true that the conclusion holds only if the premises do:

i. Barack Obama is in Washington, D.C. (Premise)
ii. If Barack Obama is in Washington, D.C., then Barack Obama is in the United States. (Premise)
iii. Barack Obama is in the United States. (Conclusion)

This, again, is a valid logical argument; if (i) and (ii) hold, (iii) must necessarily follow. However, (iii) could be true even if (i) and (ii) didn't hold; hence "(iii) only if [(i) and (ii)]" is false.