Determinism.....

[Ryft]

Am I right [that] you think the will is determined, maybe from the beginning of time, but the individual is free because he is acting on his will? If the will is determined [in this sense], then how can you blame someone for doing what they do when they couldn't have done any differently?

Because they could have done differently, as you put it. Theirs is not a physical inability but a moral one. As pastor John Piper put it, "Physical inability would remove accountability. Moral inability does not." You are wrestling with a very old dilemma from which came the heresy of Pelagius (5th century; see also Erasmus vs. Luther, 16th century), a dilemma that was answered just as long ago by Augustine with a response that still rings forth today. Although Jonathan Edwards expounded on this at great depth (see Freedom of the Will), the matter was clarified perhaps no more succinctly than this statement from Arthur Pink: "By nature [man] possesses natural ability but lacks moral and spiritual ability. The fact that he does not possess the latter does not destroy his responsibility, because his responsibility rests upon the fact that he does possess the former" (The Sovereignty of God, pg. 154). We have the natural faculties to understand the commands of God and natural ability to keep them. "Man is guilty for the simple reason that, in his sinful rebellion, he refuses to do that which he has the full mental and physical ability to do. His problem is a moral and spiritual problem: he is a sinner at heart, who has no desire for God or godliness."

When a thief tries to justify his action, he is demonstrating that he knows very well that stealing is wrong; he is attempting to define an exception, which shows he accepts the rule. He knows the difference between right and wrong and has the ability to choose. He committed theft not because he was incapable of doing otherwise but because he wanted to and chose to, despite knowing that theft in itself is wrong.

Why is it that someone does action X instead of Y?

Because their desire for X was greater.

Would you agree that for an action to be free and morally responsible it can't be determined (nor random) and so must go through a thought process?

You are making the case for 'compatibilism' (although at this point you may not realize it), which I concur with. In order for an action to be free, it cannot be determined or causally necessitated from without. And in order for an action to be morally culpable, it cannot be random. But an action is both free and morally culpable if it is determined from within (i.e., causally necessitated by one's character and desires, or "must go through a thought process"). This is the compatibilist model of Christian doctrine. "The moral quality of the deed, considered in itself, is rooted in the moral character of the subordinate agent, acting in the circumstances and under the motives operative in each instance" (Benjamin Warfield, Biblical Doctrines, pg. 20).

[To EvidenceVsFaith] Would you also agree it is quite a dangerous view?

Extremely dangerous.

As for me, I would say the end doesn't always justify the means ...

Same here, and for so many reasons, not least of which is the all too obvious fact that the end is beyond our knowing! The end cannot justify the means when the end is incapable of being known. The problem that inheres in consequentialist theories is that it does not help us decide the moral value of the consequent: (i) if an action is said to have the value of its consequent, (ii) and we do not know the value of the consequent, (iii) then we cannot know the value of the action that produced it. And the value of the consequent must be accounted for, not assumed, because it is a logical fallacy to beg the question.

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Yet moral relativists who subscribe to "the ends justify the means" would argue that the end result was the best possible, and so invalidates any "morality" associated with the means of getting there.

And they would argue thus in vain. Since the end cannot be known, the means cannot be justified. See the syllogistic analysis I presented to Solarwave. (Consider how this plays out with respect to your moral dilemma: Although saving the 100 people at the expense of the baby's life seems morally preferable, the consequentialist is incapable of knowing that the baby was actually going to become the person who found the cure for AIDS; i.e., had he saved the baby instead, it would have resulted in the saving of countless more than a mere 100 lives, an extraordinarily greater good. His choice was actually the immoral one, and he had no idea.)

Moral absolutists would say that killing the baby is an immoral act, and you cannot balance immoral acts with a lot of moral acts. ... Moral absolutists would not be able to make the decision, since both roads lead to immoral decisions.

True, both options are immoral. But where do you get the idea that moral absolutists never choose immoral options? What I mean is, although both options are immoral that doesn't mean the moral absolutist is incapable of choosing one over the other, committing what he knows to be an immoral act (either way).

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Maybe Hitler was just doing God's work. I certainly don't think this. I am simply offering up an idea.

I do think this—but in the same sense that Sennacherib, the Assyrian king, was doing God's work (Isa. 10:5-16; cf. 2 Kings 19). However, I also think that the Allied forces who defeated Hitler were also doing God's work.

"The LORD works out everything for his own ends—even the wicked for a day of disaster" (Prov. 16:4); "When disaster comes to a city, has not the LORD caused it?" (Amos 3:6). "See, it is I who created the blacksmith who fans the coals into flame and forges a weapon fit for its work. And it is I who have created the destroyer to work havoc" (Isa. 54:16). "Who can speak and have it happen if the Lord has not decreed it? Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that both calamities and good things come?" (Lam. 3:37-38). "When times are good, be happy; but when times are bad, consider: God has made the one as well as the other" (Eccl. 7:14). "He changes times and seasons; he sets up kings and deposes them" (Dan. 2:20-21). "For there is no [governing] authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God" (Rom. 13:1).

And so on.