(April 7, 2013 at 7:40 pm)Rhythm Wrote: Logical? LOL, whew boy. While the specifics of any ontological arguments validity would be a case by case basis - the soundess of every ontological argument for god falls on the very same axe.
(you butchered platingas argument, but it doesn't matter that you did)
What makes it interesting to me too, is that when we try to plug in different things for a necessary being (like a magical elephant or the universe), it doesn't work. We know they cannot be ontologically possibly necessary.
It in fact, only works, for what properties would be necessary in all worlds.
For example, a magical elephant. Instead of being an elephant, it would be possible it be a monkey ontologically. Hence cannot be the necessary being.
However, if it must be one, simple existence, ultimate in it's attributes (although I still lean to the idea it would not be worthy of worship because it didn't earn it's attributes) that form simple existence, then there is no problem.
If we define it to have colours, then it's problematic, because why can't it have 1 colour over another.
If we give it shape, then why can't it have a certain shape in one possible world as opposed to another.
Not only does it seem that ontologically, a necessary being is possible, but that ontologically, we get to know the properties of that being.
If it didn't need to be ultimate in life, then why can't it have a certain amount of life over the other. Suppose we say 1000 is it's qualitive mass of power. Why can't it be 1001. etc.. ontologically, it would be possible.
But the necessary being by definition, must be something that it cannot be otherwise in other worlds. Therefore if it's the possible ultimate eternal being, we get to know some properties of it.
This is what makes the proof even weirder. Somehow tied into language, is the very properties of what this necessary being can possibly be, while everything else seems impossible to be the necessary being.
