RE: Plantiga's ontological argument.
April 9, 2013 at 11:31 am
(This post was last modified: April 9, 2013 at 11:44 am by Mystic.)
(April 9, 2013 at 11:21 am)JesusHChrist Wrote: Out of my depth here, but I'll shoot off my mouth anyway:
Isn't one no-god possible world, a world where the universe (or meta-universe if you like) has always existed in some zero energy-state quantum structure, that occasionally produces universes? Oddly, that does appear to be the world we are living in.
If there is a world where it's possible for God to not exist, it would mean God definitely doesn't exist in any possible worlds or is not possible.
I would say what strengthens the argument, is that we are more justified in believing in worlds where a Necessary Being is possible, then believing in worlds that he isn't.
The reason is because of contingency. It can be possibly that existence is contingent upon the Creator(including himself) necessarily. So we can't say it's definitely possible that a possible existence could exist without this being.
But then this becomes an issue "for all we know", right? Not really.
If we can we definitely know a possible world where this necessary being would exist, then it necessarily follows we know he exists if we know this argument to be true (a huge IF).
The reverse is true, but who claims to know for sure a possible world exists that can possibly be not contingent.
It perhaps is ontologically not possible.