RE: Plantiga's ontological argument.
April 24, 2013 at 12:16 am
(This post was last modified: April 24, 2013 at 12:27 am by Mystic.)
Ok thanks for the clarification Shell B.
I think it's not known to me for certain, the premise, but I would still say it seems to be the case that a necessary being is ontologically possible.
This is where I think I differ with many Atheists. Rhythm in the thread of argument from perpetual identity said he was not willing to base any conclusions on having a perpetual identity even though he says it seems to be the case that we do have one.
I don't emphasize on the doubt. Rather I emphasize on what seems to be the case, then emphasize on that non-certainty.
This is why I said while this argument doesn't prove a necessary being exists, it does improve it's likelihood from the perspective from "all we know".
Another thing is if the premise is possibly true, then what if a necessary being exists? Is it then impossible to know it is possible even then?
I think it's not known to me for certain, the premise, but I would still say it seems to be the case that a necessary being is ontologically possible.
This is where I think I differ with many Atheists. Rhythm in the thread of argument from perpetual identity said he was not willing to base any conclusions on having a perpetual identity even though he says it seems to be the case that we do have one.
I don't emphasize on the doubt. Rather I emphasize on what seems to be the case, then emphasize on that non-certainty.
This is why I said while this argument doesn't prove a necessary being exists, it does improve it's likelihood from the perspective from "all we know".
Another thing is if the premise is possibly true, then what if a necessary being exists? Is it then impossible to know it is possible even then?
