RE: Determinism Is Self Defeating
July 10, 2013 at 8:23 pm
(This post was last modified: July 10, 2013 at 8:28 pm by bennyboy.)
@Rhythm:
I think either we have different standards of what determinism is, or different standards of application.
It is your idea, I think, that the predictability of at least some systems constitutes evidence of determinism. After all, if you can consistently predict the result of a system, then that's a good indication that that system could not have turned out otherwise.
However, I don't accept predictability in simple systems as evidence for philosophical determinism: that in a physical monism, ALL states must grind through their calculations, with exactly (and only) ONE possible resultant state. There are many simple aspects of life which we cannot calculate, and which a better mathematician than I could show would require a computer of physically impossible capabilities. Let's say, for example, that you wanted to predict the world's weather, on a per-km basis. Do you write away the butterfly effect as a matter of faith, "We COULD calculate it if we had a better computer?" Do you bolster your confidence with statistics: "We predicted 70% chance of rain for an area of 10,000 square km, and we measured rain in 70% of the stations in that area! Yay?"
Let's say you have a predictive system which requires the value pi. Two things become suddenly obvious: 1) your predictive ability will never be perfect, and you can never prove absolute determinism: your result will always give a RANGE of possible outcomes; 2) subsequent predictions will ALWAYS eventually go from 99.9999%, to 99%, and down to 0.00001% confidence levels, no matter how many digits of pi you've arbitrarily settled on as "good enough." Even good ol' classical billiard-ball calculations will confound you pretty quick.
So claims that simple predictions constitute evidence for determinism essentially imply: "IF we could have the complete value of pi, we could calculate this system perfectly." The "weight of evidence" you're talking about fails, because you aren't giving evidence for the right thing: "I can calculate how long it will take a ball to hit the Earth when I drop it, every time, within 1 thousandth of a second" does not constitute meaningful evidence for philosophical determinism.
I think either we have different standards of what determinism is, or different standards of application.
It is your idea, I think, that the predictability of at least some systems constitutes evidence of determinism. After all, if you can consistently predict the result of a system, then that's a good indication that that system could not have turned out otherwise.
However, I don't accept predictability in simple systems as evidence for philosophical determinism: that in a physical monism, ALL states must grind through their calculations, with exactly (and only) ONE possible resultant state. There are many simple aspects of life which we cannot calculate, and which a better mathematician than I could show would require a computer of physically impossible capabilities. Let's say, for example, that you wanted to predict the world's weather, on a per-km basis. Do you write away the butterfly effect as a matter of faith, "We COULD calculate it if we had a better computer?" Do you bolster your confidence with statistics: "We predicted 70% chance of rain for an area of 10,000 square km, and we measured rain in 70% of the stations in that area! Yay?"
Let's say you have a predictive system which requires the value pi. Two things become suddenly obvious: 1) your predictive ability will never be perfect, and you can never prove absolute determinism: your result will always give a RANGE of possible outcomes; 2) subsequent predictions will ALWAYS eventually go from 99.9999%, to 99%, and down to 0.00001% confidence levels, no matter how many digits of pi you've arbitrarily settled on as "good enough." Even good ol' classical billiard-ball calculations will confound you pretty quick.
So claims that simple predictions constitute evidence for determinism essentially imply: "IF we could have the complete value of pi, we could calculate this system perfectly." The "weight of evidence" you're talking about fails, because you aren't giving evidence for the right thing: "I can calculate how long it will take a ball to hit the Earth when I drop it, every time, within 1 thousandth of a second" does not constitute meaningful evidence for philosophical determinism.
