On Belief in God X

[genkaus]

I don't know if you're picking up on the subtleties here, or if you outright disagree with these subtleties, but the royal flush scenario highlights the irrelevance of probabilities. Think of this alternate scenario: I deal 5 cards to you. You turn them over and see cards p, q, r, s and t. The chances of that ever happening were going to be some ridiculously small number, yet you sit there with the experiential justification that rightly allows you to claim you indeed have been dealt cards p, q, r, s and t, regardless of the maths.

I disagree. While the experiential justification is sufficient for me to believe that I hold those cards, to rightly claim it, i.e. claim with the expectation of others believing me, I would require more than that. While experiential justification trumps improbability, they don't have that justification for believing me and therefore, for them, the improbability still is a valid reason for skepticism. And while, as a matter of convenience, they may accept my claim due to the lower significance of cards I hold, I cannot expect the same acceptance if I claim to hold a royal flush.

because (and this is up for debate) I think the royal flush scenario *by nature* puts the royal flush holder in a position where they have a "one up". Why? Well, because properly basic beliefs are a damn strong reason to hold on to said beliefs. Would you ever accept that you need to question I dealt you cards p, q, r, s and t when they're sitting right in front of you? Do we need to acknowledge Descartes' demon has been sitting at the table this whole time? No, I think we can assume that what you see is what you see, regardless of improbability or deep skepticism of the senses. As the nature of the scenario implies, no one actually has impaired senses.

As I have said before, given sufficient reason to do so, I would accept that I need to question that I have been dealt the cards p...t. And as I have also said before, I do not consider improbability to be sufficient reason, but improbability combined with a myriad of other reasons would be.

In light of this, that's why it's actually irrational to ask the royal flush holder to check again, to see if they really have a royal flush. I could ask you the same thing with cards p, q, r, s and t, and it would go something like this:

Me: so you really have those cards, despite the odds?

You: yes.

Me: are you sure? The odds suggest you should check again. Do you really have those cards?

You: yes.

Me: ok, but just to make sure, could you check one final time?

You: ok... *looks down, and back up again* *sigh* yeees!


Let's bring this back to the real world:


Atheist: you are deluded. You didn't experience God.

Theist: I am sure of it. It was *undeniable* (appeal to their properly basic belief).

Atheist: you need to be rational. It's highly unlikely that it was a genuine experience.

Theist: I know what I felt/heard/saw (appeal to their experiential justification of said belief).

Atheist: there are a myriad of other explanations.

Theist: ...I know what I felt/heard/saw!!!!

That is both an inaccurate representation and analogy. The "myriad of other explanations" argument isn't reflected in the cards analogy. And more significantly, appeal to improbability is not the only argument we use in a theist atheist debate. If that were the only counter in our arsenal, then we wouldn't expect theists to question their experience even if we still would've sufficient reason to remain skeptical.

Basically, I think properly basic beliefs are something we can't deny to ourselves. I dealt you cards p, q, r, s and t, and as a result, you have an inescapable belief that that is in fact so - that I dealt you cards p...t. Therefore, to allow such beliefs to be "sound" in everyday living, such as giving testimony about something relatively trivial you saw to a friend, and not have to ask to "check your hand again", surely means that the same should go for a theist who felt/heard/saw something x years ago which made them think differently about the world. Unless of course one has a strong bias against that particular brand of properly basic belief for some unknown reason. Then maybe you should stay consistent and question the entirety of what you experience and ask if there really is an external world beyond the Self. If you don't have reason to do that, then neither does the theist for their subset of alleged experiences. If so, then your only logical alternative is to grant them that experiential justification, but find *different* means to show them that justification actually needs to be discarded.

I think you are trivializing the significance of triviality here. We grant validity to experiential justifications in trivial matters, even though it is not logical to do so, because it is much more convenient. It is not a question of bias but of relevance to oneself. I may accept someone's claim that they experienced Angelina Jolie (that came out dirtier than intended) because such a claim is relatively insignificant. The claim of experiencing god is much more significant. Especially when it entails directives regarding my behavior. The consistency here would be regarding the thumb rule for experiences of greater significance to require greater evidence.

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Because my last post seems a bit meandering and confusing, I will state my position as briefly as possible.

A person may hold experience as sufficient justification for a belief - IF there aren't any valid objections to that belief or any valid alternate explanations for the experience. He also cannot expect others who do not share the same experience to accept his belief on his say so. The probability of his belief would play a role in others' acceptance of it.

A person who does not have the experience and has no valid reasons for or against the said belief, may condition his acceptance (but not his denial) upon the probability and significance of it being true. For example, if the probability of it being true is high or the significance low, one may accept such a belief. It may not be logical, but its more convenient.