P1) Humans have free will to choose otherwise than they did (libertarian).
P2) God's providence over history is such that he orders things overall to accomplish his divine plan.
P3) If [P2] is true, then God's 'orderings' of history will by necessity transgress on an agent's ability to have done otherwise ([P1]) in at least some capacity.
P4) In the worldview of Abrahamic monotheists, [P2] is true.
C) Therefore, in the worldview of an Abrahamic monotheist there can be no certainty regarding the libertarian concept of free will's truth at any given point.
Hm, I'm not really sure about this argument. And I don't tend to try to use omniscience to rule out "free will" either.
I'm not sure if I'm progressing through the argument very well. Where does the argument go wrong and can it be fixed?
P2) God's providence over history is such that he orders things overall to accomplish his divine plan.
P3) If [P2] is true, then God's 'orderings' of history will by necessity transgress on an agent's ability to have done otherwise ([P1]) in at least some capacity.
P4) In the worldview of Abrahamic monotheists, [P2] is true.
C) Therefore, in the worldview of an Abrahamic monotheist there can be no certainty regarding the libertarian concept of free will's truth at any given point.
Hm, I'm not really sure about this argument. And I don't tend to try to use omniscience to rule out "free will" either.
I'm not sure if I'm progressing through the argument very well. Where does the argument go wrong and can it be fixed?
