RE: The Ontological Argument
July 29, 2013 at 6:45 pm
(This post was last modified: July 29, 2013 at 6:46 pm by MikeTheInfidel.)
It is possible that the greatest a being can actually be is less than maximally great. (That is, it is possible that a maximally great being cannot exist.)
Thus, there is a possible world in which a maximally great being cannot (and therefore does not) exist.
Thus, no being can be maximally great, since being maximally great involves existing in all possible worlds.
That's just playing within the boundaries of modal logic. If we're going to deal with reality, possible worlds don't exist. Only the actual world exists. The concept of "maximally great" is incoherent in the face of reality and it becomes plainly obvious that he's attempting to define God into existence by insisting it must exist in all nonexistent and existent worlds.
Thus, there is a possible world in which a maximally great being cannot (and therefore does not) exist.
Thus, no being can be maximally great, since being maximally great involves existing in all possible worlds.
That's just playing within the boundaries of modal logic. If we're going to deal with reality, possible worlds don't exist. Only the actual world exists. The concept of "maximally great" is incoherent in the face of reality and it becomes plainly obvious that he's attempting to define God into existence by insisting it must exist in all nonexistent and existent worlds.
