Pleasure and Joy

[genkaus]

I think you saw the syllogism in the most sensible way, but I wasn't talking about that: I'm saying that EVEN IF some people actually experience and have brain function X, brain function X cannot be taken as sufficient proof that someone actually experiences.

Actually, it is sufficient evidence. If I establish the simultaneous existence of actual experience and brain function X, then, in future, I can regard the presence of brain function X as sufficient proof of existence of that person's awareness.

In fact, it's not even that. The truth is I have access to exactly one consciousness-- and I cannot infer from any physical similarity to me that anyone else actually experiences. I can only assume it.

No, you can infer it. We infer things about existent entities without direct access all the time.

For example, I see the physical similarity between the jaw structure of lions and sabre-tooth tigers and I infer carnivory of the sabre-tooth.

As a matter of fact, I can infer existence of actual experience based on physical appearance alone. If you are overweight, it'd suggest a certain fondness for food which would not be possible without existence of subjective experience.

Maybe not. But if the brain is a physical mechanism and nothing more, then it can process data and output behaviors without actual awareness.

Processing data is itself a form of awareness. When you are aware of something, it means you receive information from that entity to process. The specific form of awareness you are talking about here is a type of self-awareness, i.e. being aware of the fact that you are aware of external environment. It is another layer of awareness on top of other layers.

So yes, brain as a physical mechanism can process data and output behaviors (as it does for most of our body functions) without actual subjective awareness - but, addition of the subjective awareness function would not magically make it a non-physical mechanism.

Any physical machine that requires that special quality is really evidence for a soul, rather than a proof that there isn't one.

No it isn't. Since that "special" quality is easily explicable as an additional layer of pre-existing function, invoking an arbitrary and undefinable concept like 'soul' is not required. And by the way, we don't need to prove that there isn't a soul - the same way we don't need to prove there isn't a god.

You can say whatever you want. But I don't accept it-- it must be proven.

Your acceptance is unnecessary. That's what the evidence suggests.

All those things are inferred purely based on what you can see, or believe that you COULD see, if you chose to go do it yourself.

All those things are based on what I can see - evidence of existence, though not existence itself - and its the same for consciousness. And like consciousness, I cannot directly see the black holes or the dinosaurs or the crime being committed - all I have to go on is the evidence.

If you want to start attributing qualities to them that are not required to explain observations, then you are on weak ground.

You are the one doing that - not me. You are the one attributing qualities like soul when the naturalistic explanation is sufficient.

I accept that the brain takes in light and processes touch, sound, etc. I accept that brains result in behaviors. I do not accept that any of these processes necessarily indicates actual experience. This must be assumed.

Only if you ignore any and all behaviors that require experience to occur. Simple processing of external stimuli would result in one set of behavior - such a flinching from touch or pupils contracting from light. Processing of this process - which is what experience is - results in a whole different set of behavior. You cannot answer any personal questions (why did you pick a banana instead of an apple, which do you like better - chocolate or vanilla?) without there being actual experience.

Why does it matter? Because it may soon come that man-made machines can simulate human behavior closely enough to elicit sincere emotional responses (love, anger, etc.) from actual humans. So should we strive to sustain these mechanisms and give them rights? No-- because it may very well be that they don't actually experience, in the way that we do.

What we have here is the naked fallacy of "appeal to consequences". You do not like the possible consequence of the given explanation - an explanation which, by the way, has been philosophically justified and has scientific support - and that is your reason for rejecting it. In doing so, you are wrong - plain and simple.

As fro the consequence you have envisaged:
1. For machines to simulate human behavior without actual experience would be, in my opinion, impossible. A great deal of human behavior is contingent upon personal desires, knowledge, beliefs and past experience - all of which require actual subjective awareness. Replicating these without that awareness would not be possible.

2. We do not grant rights based on the capacity to be self-aware. We know that a lot of animals are, in fact, self-aware and capable of subjective experience like love, hate, anger and also capable of evoking similar response in humans. But they are not given any rights and if that is the level of awareness displayed by the machines, they wouldn;t be either.

3. The criteria for granting rights, i.e. the capacity for acting rationally, the capacity to act with reference to one's beliefs, knowledge, emotions etc. is to be applied in this case. If the machines fulfill this criteria, then they should be given equal human rights - regardless of allegations of true Scotsman's experience.