(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: Have I stated otherwise? I fully agree, since I've said that you cannot use experience to validate ideas about the ultimate nature of experience.
You have stated otherwise. Read my argument again and you'll see that we are not in agreement.
I'm saying that you can use experience to validate ideas about the ultimate nature of experience.
What you cannot do is use the simple fact of having experience to validate ideas about the ultimate nature of experience.
(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: Only in the way that Casablanca is a reel of celluloid with light shining through it, and nothing more.
Quite the opposite. Reel of celluloid with light shining through would be the level of data-processing of your eyes receiving optical data. Its identity as a movie and your experience of vision require an additional level of data-processing.
(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: Your appeal to emotion on my behalf is noted and discarded. I'm not arguing that Cyberboy's experience belittles my own.
Actually, you did make that argument.
(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: I'm arguing that since I know that at least one human (me) actually experiences, and since I do not have access to Cyberboy's experience (or lack thereof), I'm willing to assume that other humans actually experience, but not that Cyberboy does, regardless of how it behaves.
And I'm saying that the limitation of your knowledge does not make that knowledge impossible. Unlike you, we do not assume that other humans have experience - we know. We know not because of physical similarities, but because neurological, physiological, verbal and behavioral indicators of experience are present in them. Which is why if cyberboy satisfies one or more of that criteria, the reasonable conclusion is that it has experience. Your insistence on denying that is counter-factual.
(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: And you are ignoring the same refutation over and over again: that you are conflating subjective (i.e. actual) experience with physicals markers that SEEM to indicate experience, but can never be proven to do so.
On the contrary, I've made the distinction very clear and thus refuted your refutation over and over again.
The behavioral indicators (how you act and what you say) are consequences of experience occurring. Certain physiological indicators (increased heart-beat, rush of adrenaline) are consequences of experience occurring. This I know because I perceive these consequences occurring within myself. Which is why I know that they don't simply seem to indicate experience - they do indicate experience. Which is why when I see them in others, I conclude that they too are capable of experience.
The neurological indicators are experience. The same way that electronic signals are software. There is no conflation - we are just examining the same phenomenon at different levels. And it can be proven quite simply. Alterations in the electronic signals produce consistent changes in the software and changes in the software result in changes in those signals. Similarly, changes in your neurological make-up alter your experience and changes in your experience result in neurological alterations.
(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's goofy. That's like saying that the rejection of someone's "knowledge" of God is a positive assertion and bears the burden of proof.
If that person has provided rational, testable and falsifiable justification for that knowledge, then yes, it's rejection would be a positive assertion and bear the burden of proof.
(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: You are making assertions about the nature of experience, and I'm saying you haven't proven those assertions to be more than either assumptions or meaning-changing conflations-- just as you would do if a Christian tried to say, "Everything that exists is the Body of God, therefore I CAN show you God in the lab." You'd say that's a goofy definition of God, and refuse to accept his "evidence" as valid. And that's exactly what I'm saying to you.
Except for the little fact that I have proven my assertion to be more than assumptions or meaning-changing conflations. My explanation of experience is compatible with its standard definition. And that would be the criteria for judging conflation - not your vague, inexplicable redefinition. And my assertions have been supported by evidence - evidence that complies with the accepted scientific standard. Unlike this hypothetical Christian, I'm not redefining, conflating or starting with assumptions. Which is why your counter-argument is invalid.
(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: Except that "processing data" is itself another mind-existent word: really, what you have is a bunch of particles interchanging energy. The solar system does this-- so by your definition, the solar system has imagination. As does the sun. As does the hair on my chinny chin chin. OR you are going to say, "No. I'm talking about super-duper SPECIAL data processing, not the infinite (and super-complex) exchanges of energy happening all throughout the universe.
Must you keep repeating the same fallacies over and over again? Yes, I am referring to imagination as a specific form of data-processing. And no, I do not refer to any and every "particles interchanging energy" as data-processing. Which is why all the other events mentioned here do not qualify for data-processing, much less imagination.
